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What FEMA Should Do After Puerto Rico:
Toward Critical Administrative
Constitutionalism
Yxta Maya Murray
The 200th anniversary of the 1819 Supreme Court decision
McCulloch v. Maryland offers scholars a special opportunity to
study the shortcomings of the federal The Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as they
were revealed by FEMA’s failures in Puerto Rico during and
after Hurricane Maria. Under Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, as it has been interpreted by McCulloch, a law
passed by Congress must be necessary and proper for executing
its powers.1 In light of the expansive capacities allotted for
disaster relief under the Stafford Act, 2 and the catastrophic
failure of FEMA to provide meaningful aid to vulnerable
populations in Puerto Rico in the Fall of 2017, scholars of race
and class justice are faced with a melancholy-inducing reminder:
Even a well-drafted law passed by Congress for the betterment of
the general welfare may be “necessary,” but not rise to the level
of “proper.” Meaningfully, the test for propriety here grows out
of by McCulloch’s demand that laws cohere to the “letter and
spirit” of the Constitution, as well as anti-subordination
interpretations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that
require equal protection to be pursued in light of the lived
experience of vulnerable and minority populations. 3
Why is the Stafford Act improper under anti-subordination
principles? Though the Stafford Act enables the marshaling of
immense federal powers to come to the succor of U.S. disaster

Professor, Loyola Law School. Thank you to Professor David Schwartz for inviting me
to deliver this paper at the University of Wisconsin Law School in November 2018. Thank
you also to Sophia Z. Lee, Allan Ides, and Karl Manheim.
1. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324 (1819).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2012).
3. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
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victims and forbids discriminatory allotment of aid relief, 4 it was
not able to ensure that the territory of Puerto Rico received help
that was equal to that experienced by citizens in Houston and
Florida during the September 2017 hurricane season. This
failure came about because the Stafford Act failed to provide
sufficient instruction or direction in how to implement the act in
ways conscious of race, class, age, and physical ability
difference.
In this paper, I study evidence of the Stafford Act’s raced,
disablist, and classed impropriety, but (unsurprisingly) pull away
from any suggestion that it should be struck down under Article I
or the test created McCulloch v. Maryland. Instead, I argue that
the propriety of the law – that is, its future execution in light of
the demands of race, disability, and class justice in disaster
situations – will require that FEMA embrace its role as an equal
distributor of disaster aid under the Stafford Act. In so doing, I
maintain that FEMA agents should embrace what scholars such
as Gillian Metzger, Sophia Z. Lee, and Karen Tani describe as
“administrative constitutionalism,” and constitutional “norm
entrepreneurship.”5 FEMA agents may do so by recognizing that
they cannot distribute equal protection of the Stafford Act without
recognizing victims’ race, gender, ability, and class differences,
otherwise described as “intersectionality” by critical race
scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw.6
In this paper, I draw upon the work of administrative
constitutionalists such as Metzger, Tani, and Lee, as well as that
of William Eskridge and John Ferejohn. In my encouragement of
joining administrative constitutionalism with anti-subordination
critical theories, I use the term “critical administrative
constitutionalism” and argue that FEMA’s adoption of this ethic
is necessary if future execution of the Stafford Act is ever to be
truly proper.

4. 42 U.S.C. § 5151 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1897, 1900, 1920 (2013).
6. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under Article I of the Constitution, the United States
possesses a federal government of considerable powers.7 Article
I’s listed powers bind Congress’s enactments, as they mandate
that federal statutes find “affirmative[] authoriz[ation]” from the
Constitution.8 Clause eighteen of Article I’s section eight grants
Congress authority to pass laws that are “necessary and proper”
to fulfill its powers.9 Chief Justice Marshall, in the early 19th
century decision of McCulloch v. Maryland,10 established a
three-prong test to determine whether congressional legislation
was “necessary and proper.” The law must have a legitimate end,
an appropriate means, and comply with the “letter and spirit” of
the
Constitution.11
As scholars such as David Schwartz observes, an ideological
conflict between enumerationists and what he calls capable
federalists has ensued in the 200 years since McCulloch was
decided.12
The strictest enumerationism – Jeffersonian
enumeration – would interpret the Necessary and Proper Clause
as confining the range of Congressional power to those that are
granted explicitly by Clauses 2 through 17 of Article I, Section
8.13
However, modern enumerationists, responding to
McCullough v. Maryland’s more liberal interpretation of the
clause,14 call for congressional acts to be tethered to enumerated
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cls.1-17. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 153, 176
(1803) (the “powers of the legislature are defined, and limited . . .”); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S.
898, 919 (1997) (Our “Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental
powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones, . . .”).
8. Michael K. Sabers, Well, It Depends on What Your Definition of
“Unconstitutional” Is: The Eighth Circuit’s Misinterpretation of Flores in Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 44 S.D. L. REV. 432, 452–53 (1999)
(citing Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-2 at 298 (2nd ed. 1988)).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Article I, section eight of the Constitution provides
that “[t]he Congress shall have Power. . .[t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated] Powers. . .”
Id.
10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
11. Id.
12. David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers, Capable
Federalism, and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 581 (2017).
13. Id.; Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Powers Doctrine, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 25, 26 (2005).
14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-16.
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powers by a means-end test15 or forbidden to express “great
powers” that are not enumerated. 16 Capable federalists, on the
other hand, see the “necessary and proper” clause as leveraging a
broad congressional authority to enact general welfare legislation
that advances the interests of the nation, redresses states’
institutional failures, and promotes interstate harmony. 17
Within this constitutional culture, then, a scholar who finds that a
Congressional law lacks necessity and/or propriety will be taking
sides in this debate. For the purposes of this paper, an advocate
who argues that a federal law may be necessary but is not proper
will find herself in the camp that wages for Congressional
limitation. Indeed, she may find herself speaking in the same
language of a very strict, perhaps Jeffersonian, interpreter of
Article I, Section 8’s delegation of powers, even if she sides with
the ethics and values of capable federalists like Professor
Schwartz.
But what if this accusation is nevertheless true? What if the
law is – in very important ways – necessary but not proper
because it does not fulfill the “letter and spirit” 18 of the
Constitution’s principle of equality? And what, exactly, would
this accusation mean?
In this paper, I will attend to this question as it relates to the
federal Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (“The Stafford Act”),19 under which the Federal
Emergency Management Agency operates when the President
declares a disaster. 20 As I recount in a previous article titled
“FEMA Has Been a Nightmare”: Epistemic Injustice in Puerto

15. John Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1104 (2011) (“The Necessary and Proper Clause is about meansends connections”).
16. See, e.g., William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power,
122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1751 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 646.
17. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 580.
18. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2012); See also Aileen M. Marty, Hurricane Katrina: A
Deadly Warning Mandating Improvement to the National Response to Disasters, 31 NOVA
L. REV. 423, 446 (2007) [hereinafter, Deadly Warning].
20. See 42 U.S.C. 5170a (1)-(2) (2012).

2019

WHAT FEMA SHOULD DO

169

Rico,21 2017’s Hurricane Maria, and the notorious and lethal
failures of the federal response to its victims in Puerto Rico,
reveal that the Stafford Act’s execution in Puerto Rico created a
race, class, and disability-rights catastrophe that is at odds with
the Constitution’s promise of equal protection:22 Independent
interviews that I conducted in November 2017, as well as a review
of contemporary news reports, reveal that Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) agents failed to get adequate
supplies to Puerto Rican victims of Maria because they did not
take care to tailor their aid to Puerto Ricans’ culture,
demographics, language, problem with poverty, health problems,
and life ways. 23 Part of the outrage caused by the failed Puerto
Rico response comes not only from the fact that so many people
died, but that the Puerto Rican aid effort paled in comparison to
the effective and “deep life-saving mission[s]”24 that took place
in comparatively wealthier and whiter Houston not only a month
before.25 That is, more privileged mainland communities
received aid that proved far more extensive and useful than that
experienced by the devastated communities in Puerto Rico. 26
Why did this happen? Looking at the problem from a
statutory level, we see that the Stafford Act, which authorizes
FEMA agents to deliver services to disaster victims, was not
“proper” from a race and class justice reading of the “letter and
spirit” of Fifth Amendment’s equal protection principle:27 The
Stafford Act makes insufficient mention of the ways in which
FEMA actors must take into account intersectionality when
implementing the act – that is, allocating life-saving assistance to
disaster victims. 28 Intersectionality is the famous term coined by
Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, 29 and elaborated by many other
critical race, feminist, ability, and queer legal scholars 30 to
21. Yxta Maya Murray, Epistemic Injustice in Puerto Rico (2018), Legal Studies Paper
No. 2018-34 Willamette L. Rev. (forthcoming) [hereinafter, Epistemic Injustice].
22. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 136-46.
24. See infra note 103.
25. See infra text accompanying note 103.
26. See infra text accompanying note 40.
27. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
28. See infra notes 172-89.
29. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1249 (addressing language intersectionality).
30. See infra notes 224-31.
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describe the ways in which poor, 31 rural,32 queer,33 disabled,34
women35 and/or people of color 36 may embody different sources
of oppression, and thereby deviate from the assumed norm of a
white, male, middle-class, straight person who is not experiencing
disability.37
Critical race feminists advocate treating
intersectional oppressions as problems of unequal protection. 38
As an apparent consequence of a failure to bake in
intersectional consciousness into Stafford powers of protection,
and (as a consequence) FEMA culture, thousands of people have
died in Puerto Rico in the months since the storm, 39 whereas the
contemporaneous storm-caused losses in Houston and Florida,
while tragic, were far less extreme. 40 Some observers have
charged a denial of equal protection of the laws resulting from
this asymmetry,41 though current constitutional law appears to

31. On poverty as a form of intersectionality, see, e.g., Sara K. Rankin, The Influence
of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4, 20 (2016) (describing “the intersectionality of poverty,
homelessness, and other marginalized traits”).
32. On rural intersectionality, see, e.g., Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of
the Rural, 2007 UTAH L. REV.421, 433-34 (2007).
33. On queer intersectionality, and of multidimensionality, see infra notes 224-31.
34. Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of
Women and Children with Disabilities Within an Interrelated Web of Human Rights, 18 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 293, 294 (2009) (“women and children living with disabilities face
multiple forms of discrimination on the bases of their gender, age, disability and other
identities”).
35. On gender and intersectionality, see Crenshaw, infra note 50.
36. On race and the varieties of intersectionality see supra notes 29-35.
37. Id.
38. Jean Montoya, What’s So Magic(al) About Black Women? Peremptory Challenges
at the Intersection of Race and Gender, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 369, 395 (1996) (arguing
for the “treat[ment of] intersectional status the same way race and gender are treated
under equal protection analysis.”).
39. See infra notes 147-51.
40. See Eva Ruth Moravec, Texas officials: Hurricane Harvey Death Toll at 82, ‘Mass
Casualties Have Absolutely Not Happened,’ THE WASHINGTON POST (SEPT. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/texas-officials-hurricane-harvey-death-toll-at82-mass-casualties-have-absolutely-not-happened/2017/09/14/bff3ffea-9975-11e7-87fcc3f7ee4035c9_story.html?utm_term=.004c3be54bbd
[https://perma.cc/RX6Q-UA8N];
Alexa Mains, 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season By The Numbers: An Extremely Active
Season, WEATHER BUG (OCT. 7, 2018), https://www.weatherbug.com/news/2017-AtlanticHurricane-Season-By-The-Numbers-An [https://perma.cc/KN83-URGA] (describing the 90
deaths suffered in Florida due to 2017 Hurricane Irma). For comparison, see estimated toll
of over 4,000 (and an estimate of 8,000) in Puerto Rico, infra notes 146-51.
41. See infra notes 160-65.
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foreclose any real relief. 42 Nevertheless, from a race liberationist
perspective, the Stafford Act is necessary, but it is not proper:
The Stafford Act could only be properly coherent with the “letter
and spirit”43 of the Constitution if it recognized the crucial and
complex realities of race and class difference, and made specific
suggestions for how to implement the Act in light of these
dynamics, so that disaster aid is rendered equally to majority and
minority communities.
Three objections immediately crop up upon making this
argument, however. The first counterargument observes that, if
we accuse the Stafford Act of McCulloch impropriety, we seem
to be speaking in the language of enumerationism, and arguing
that the Stafford Act should be struck down. 44 Yet if 2017 taught
us anything, it was that natural disasters can create cataclysms
that imperil life and property to such a degree that it would be
madness to strike down a law that allows the federal government
to respond to these catastrophes with its resources. 45 Many
people horrified at the U.S.’s devastation in 2017 and 2018 from
hurricanes and wildfires46 will appreciate the liberality of
McCulloch v. Maryland47 and even find themselves enthusiastic
adopters of capable federalism in order to defend the Stafford
Act.48
The second problem is subtler: Upon observing that the
Stafford Act makes no or limited mention of race, class, gender,
or sexuality, we may next query whether, if it had, this language
would have made any real difference in the Puerto Rican relief
roll-out? It turns out that the Stafford Act does contain mentions
of disability and of the elderly, and these were two of the
populations most injured by the storm and FEMA’s failures
during and after September 17. 49 As a consequence, we may

42. See infra notes 201-02. For other possible avenues of legal redress, see infra note
170 (detailing a claim that the FEMA actions should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
43. See supra note 11.
44. See supra notes 13-16.
45. See infra note 98.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 10.
48. See supra note 17.
49. See infra note 155.
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conclude that a federal law that covers problems of this magnitude
(natural disasters and the perils they present to the entire U.S.
community) will face steep obstacles to qualifying as “proper”
from a race and class justice perspective. 50 What efforts would
Congress have to make, for example, to write a law that would
ensure that poor, elderly people of color with diabetes and in
wheelchairs receive meaningful care in the event of a level 4
hurricane?51 Natural disasters create problems with so many
dimensions and moving parts, and it is difficult to conceive of our
current Congress, which has experienced recent, paralyzing
gridlock,52 from creating a precise, sensitive, and effective statute
that might have helped one of the U.S.’s most vulnerable
populations.
The third objection would hold that such fine-tuning of
bureaucratic decision-making and implementation discretion is
better left to the agency itself; after all, a desire to capitalize on
agency expertise and agents’ nuts and bolts knowledge of disaster
preparedness would constitute the reason for Congress’s
delegation of the Stafford powers to the President. 53 The
argument that the Stafford Act is itself “improper” seems to raise
the specter of the nondelegation doctrine, which some have
described as “dead.”54 Alternatively, the argument can be seen as
a wild extrapolation of the rule that agencies must not interpret
statutes in ways that create “serious” violations of Constitutional
50. See Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1242, 1246-249. (recounting inadequacies of wellintentioned exceptions Congress enacted to the Marriage Fraud Act in order to address needs
of vulnerable and immigrant victims of domestic violence).
51. See, e.g., infra note 155.
52. See Sheryl Gay Stoldberg and Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress,
Only
Gloom
Is
Bipartisan,
N.Y.
TIMES
(JAN.
27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspiraciestrump.html [https://perma.cc/VVX8-DJ86].
53. Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 474-475 (2017)
(One reason that Congress delegates to agencies in order to “exploit their superior
expertise”); Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 293, 294 (2004) (noting that such exploitation is one motivation for
delegation); J. Bendor, A. Glazer & T. Hammond, Theories of Delegation, 4 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 235, 264 (2001) (describing the “gains” of “tapping” expertise).
54. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND D ISTRUST 131-33 (1980); Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 315 (2000) (“It is often said that the
nondelegation doctrine is dead.”). See also id: “[T]he doctrine was once used to require
Congress to legislate with some clarity, so as to ensure that law is made by the national
legislature rather than by the executive.”
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law, which Cass Sunstein has described as a nondelegation
canon.55 Arguing that the Stafford Act’s omissions of the word
“intersectionality” allow it to be interpreted by FEMA in ways
seriously violative of the Constitution requires several leaps of
faith.56
For these reasons, it seems that we must look to bodies other
than Congress or the courts to make the Stafford Act “proper”
within the meaning of race and class justice. This will require
that federal administrative protocols be executed by agency actors
with a greater alertness to anti-subordination concerns. That is,
FEMA must fill in the “letter and spirit” gaps in the law.
However, a review of FEMA Administrator Brock Long’s
response to FEMA’s 2017 failures, as well as FEMA training
materials, reveals that this responsive culture does not exist
currently in the Agency. 57 If FEMA has any interest in preventing
future needless death and a concomitant ripple-effect of public
distrust,58 this must now change.
To this end, I look to the theory of administrative
constitutionalism59 described by scholars Gillian Metzger,60
Sophia Z. Lee, 61 William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, 62 and
Karen Tani.63
As Metzger explains, administrative
55. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 316. (“Administrative agencies are not permitted
to construe federal statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional questions; if the
constitutional question is substantial, Congress must clearly assert its desire to venture in the
disputed terrain.”).
56. After all, the argument that intersectionality concerns are constitutional concerns
remains for the most part a tenet found only in legal theory. See Montoya, supra note 38.
57. See infra note 255-59.
58. See Epistemic Injustice in Puerto Rico, supra note 21, at 62-63 (describing
distrust).
59. My previous article, Epistemic Injustice in Puerto Rico (2018) (on file with
author), ends with a conclusion that such administrative constitutionalism is the next step
forward. See id. at 70 (discussing work of Metzger). In this article, I flesh out that argument.
60. See Metzger, supra note 5, at 1900.
61.
See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801-2 (2010).
62. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 31 (2010).
63. Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to Be Free from Sexual Violence? Title
IX Enforcement in Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1854 (2017)
[hereinafter, An Administrative Right]; Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the
Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 320–23 (2012)
[hereinafter, Welfare and Rights].
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constitutionalism is the “elaboration” of “new constitutional
understandings by administrative actors.” 64 After Puerto Rico,
FEMA agents must be taught to recognize that they distribute
constitutional goods in a disaster situation: They must be
schooled to recognize that their failures to tailor aid efforts to
intersectional concerns will prevent them from distributing aid
equally under the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection clause.65
A transformation of training and culture is necessary to put
that recognition into play. As I adumbrate in this paper, this
conversion will require an agency engagement with theories of
intersectionality that arise from critical race theory, feminist
theory, queer legal theory, disability theory, and rural legal
theory.66 The Agency must also be trained in critical race and
feminist legal theory’s methods – that is, narrative method and
self-critique67 – in order to introduce to agents the stories of
difference that have to be absorbed for intersectional dynamics to
penetrate agency protocol.
Thus, fixing Stafford Act “impropriety” through
administrative constitutionalism also requires enriching the
theory itself: Karen Tani’s work, among others,68 reveals that
agency actors have responded to feminist and race liberationist
theory and consciousness before; 69 we may call upon the theory
and the practice to push harder in this direction, so that FEMA
actors are persuaded to absorb intersectional awareness created
by critical race theory and the narrative and self-critique methods
that it created. Making the Stafford Act “proper,” then, will
require that we move toward a Critical Administrative
Constitutionalism, which adopts narrative-rich and self-critical
race and class liberationist legal theories.
In Section II of this paper, I describe the Stafford Act and its
enactment. In Section III, I recount what happened before,
64. See Metzger, supra note 5, at 1900.
65. See text accompanying infra note 202 (observing that “the Agency could itself
recognize” that its failure to acknowledge different cultures can create an equal protection
problem under the Stafford Act).
66. See, e.g., supra notes 31-35.
67. For a discussion of CRT’s narrative method and self-critique practices, see infra
notes 224-31.
68. See, e.g., infra notes 211-12 (detailing the work of Sophia Lee).
69. See infra notes 214-18.
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during, and after Hurricane Maria. In Part IV, I describe the ways
in which Maria and its aftermath revealed the improprieties of the
Stafford Act – that is, its failure to recognize intersectional
concerns, and racial narratives – but then also query whether
additional language in the act would have been enough to make
this law “proper.” In Part V, I turn to the theory of administrative
constitutionalism, and describe how it contains the influence and
dynamics necessary to transform the Stafford Act into a “proper”
document from a race and class standpoint. I also observe that
the theory itself may be enlarged and empowered by its energetic
engagement with critical race, feminist, rural, disability rights,
and queer legal theory and methods, which include the gathering
of narratives from vulnerable communities and the engagement
of self-critique. In Section VI, I turn to Brock Long’s recent letter
of July 2018, wherein he sets forth a plan to improve FEMA in
light of its Puerto Rican failures. I demonstrate that Long’s
document reveals that FEMA does not now possess the necessary
culture to render the Stafford Act “proper.” A review of FEMA
training documents reveals the same problem. I end, in Section
VII, with a call to infuse the Agency with intersectional
consciousness, heightened through its absorption of race, class,
gender, and other narratives. Further, to the extent that this
encouragement seems Quixotic on account of the scabrous race
and class politics that motivate the current Presidential
administration, I call in Section VIII for an engagement with these
ethical values through the phenomenon described by Jennifer
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Nou,70 Rosemary O’Leary, 71 Eric Posner,72 Daniel Hemel,73 and
John Michaels 74 as “bureaucratic resistance from below.”75

II. THE STAFFORD ACT
In the following section, I describe the Stafford Act’s
enactment, its provisions, and its apparent surface-level
legitimacy under McCulloch v. Maryland. In the section
following, I describe what happened in Puerto Rico during
Hurricane Maria. In that analysis, I show how the Stafford Act
70. Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance From Below, YALE J. ON REG: NOTICE &
COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-byjennifer-nou/ [https://perma.cc/838Z-JTQV] (“It is thus the right time to ask what levers of
resistance are available to civil servants. These levers may be especially attractive to those
faced with one of several prospects: top-down orders to carry out illegal tasks, suppress
information, or doctor technical documents.”).
71. ROSEMARY O’LEARY, THE E THICS OF DISSENT: MANAGING GUERRILLA
GOVERNMENT xi (2nd ed. 2014) (“This book is about guerilla government. Guerilla
government is my term for the actions taken by career public servants who work against the
wishes – either implicitly or explicitly communicated – of their superiors.”).
72. Eric Posner, Are There Limits to Trump’s Power?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/opinion/are-there-limits-to-trumps-power.html
[https://perma.cc/EK25-88W7] (“The greatest constraint on Mr. Trump may be the federal
bureaucracy. If he directs the F.B.I., I.R.S. or Department of Homeland Security to harass
his political opponents, civil servants will probably not cooperate — indeed, they may blow
the whistle.”).
73. Daniel Hemel, President Trump vs. the Bureaucratic State, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 18, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/president-trump-vs-thebureaucratic-state-by-daniel-hemel/ [https://perma.cc/3M2W-H9WB] (“What checks and
balances might prevent President Trump from taking [illegal or at least abysmal] executive
actions . . . ? [T]he Department of Homeland Security. By this, I don’t mean the Secretary of
Homeland Security — Trump would want to pick a loyalist for that post. I mean the
Department of Homeland Security rank-and-file — the hundreds of thousands of DHS
employees whose active participation would be necessary to implement Trump’s policy
(even if they have no formal say in the matter under the Constitution).”).
74. Jon Michaels, Administrative Checks and Balances in the Trump Administration,
JUST SECURITY (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/34327/presidents-arentfoxhole-administrative-checks-balances-trump-administration/
[https://perma.cc/Z5PKH44N] (“Consider the civil service. Our professional, politically insulated civil service is
ostensibly well positioned to limit presidential overreaching.”).
75. See Nou, supra note 70. (“It is thus the right time to ask what levers of resistance
are available to civil servants. These levers may be especially attractive to those faced with
one of several prospects: top-down orders to carry out illegal tasks, suppress information, or
doctor technical documents.”); See O’Leary, supra note 71. (“This book is about guerilla
government. Guerilla government is my term for the actions taken by career public servants
who work against the wishes – either implicitly or explicitly communicated – of their
superiors.”).
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was revealed, through that disaster, as being improper from a race
and class reading of its incoherence with the “letter and spirit” of
the Constitution.

A. THE STAFFORD ACT’S ENACTMENT
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (Stafford Act) was passed by Congress in 1974. 76
Congress enacted this legislation out of recognition of the need
for the provision of emergency services during a disaster and
reconstruction of devastated areas afterwards. 77 Jimmy Carter
established FEMA by Executive Order in 1979, 78 but Congress
has “lent its approval of the agency and ratified its activities both
by appropriations and by amendments to” the Stafford Act. 79 The
Stafford Act constitutes a Congressional authorization to the
President to “provide technical assistance to the States,”80 and to
provide funds for disaster aid. 81

B. THE STAFFORD ACT’S PROVISIONS
The Stafford Act grants FEMA the authority to respond to
disasters when the President declares a disaster. 82 Under the
Stafford Act, the President (upon request by a state or territory’s
governor), may declare a major disaster, 83 and then direct any
Federal agency to use its resources “in support of State and local
assistance response and recovery efforts, including precautionary
evacuations,” as well as to “coordinate all disaster relief
76. Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207
(2000)).
77. Jillian L. Morrison, Post-Disaster Contracting: An Examination of the Costs
Associated with the Stafford Act’s Local Contracting Preference and Implementation
Proposals to Maximize Community Revitalization, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 687, 696–97 (2008).
78.
About
the
Agency,
FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/about-agency
[https://perma.cc/5MPS-5AZQ].
79. David G. Tucker & Alfred O. Bragg, III, Florida’s Law of Storms: Emergency
Management, Local Government, and the Police Power, 30 STETSON L. REV. 837, 861-62
(2001).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 5131(b) (2012).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 5131(b) (2012); see also Tucker & Bragg, III, supra note 79, at 86162, 873.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(1)-(2) (2012).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2012).
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assistance (including voluntary assistance) provided by Federal
agencies, private organizations, the state, and local
governments.84 FEMA operates under the auspices of the
Department of Homeland Security, 85 and was “[c]reated . . . to
coordinate all disaster relief efforts at the federal level;” 86 thus, it
constitutes such an agency.
Under the Stafford Act, the President may also provide
technical and advisory assistance to affected State and local
governments for the performance of essential community services
and the provision of health and safety measures.87 The President
may assist State and local governments in the distribution of
medicine, food, and other consumable supplies, and emergency
assistance, and provide accelerated Federal assistance and Federal
support where necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering,
or mitigate severe damage, even in the absence of a specific
request.88
In the dispatch of its aid efforts authorized by the President’s
triggering of the Stafford Act, FEMA may use experts and
consultants,89 and prioritize the hiring of local entities and
individuals for “assistance activities.” 90 Further, upon the
84. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(1)-(2) (2012).
85. Erin J. Greten & Ernest B. Abbott, Representing States, Tribes, and Local
Governments Before, During, and After A Presidentially-Declared Disaster, 48 URB. LAW.
489, 491 (2016) (“FEMA provides the disaster assistance programs discussed in this Article
under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
as amended (Stafford Act) as authorized in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended
(the Homeland Security Act) and delegated by the Secretary of Homeland Security
in DHS Delegation No. 9001.1.”).
86. See Deadly Warning, supra note 19, at 447; see also Organizational Chart – May
2018,
FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/15253681772629a9f9cbc941044058306af9a0a228c48/FEMAOrgChart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WG6FTUDW] [hereinafter, FEMA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART].
87. See FEMA ORGANIZATIONAL C HART, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 5149(b)(2) (2012) (allowing responding federal agencies “to employ
experts and consultants in accordance with the provisions of section 3109 of such Title,
without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such Title
relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.”).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 5150(a) (2012) (“In the expenditure of Federal funds for debris
clearance, distribution of supplies, reconstruction, and other major disaster or emergency
assistance activities which may be carried out by contract or agreement with private
organizations, firms, or individuals, preference shall be given, to the extent feasible and
practicable, to those organizations, firms, and individuals residing or doing business
primarily in the area affected by such major disaster or emergency.”).
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declaration of a disaster, the President “shall appoint a Federal
coordinating officer” who shall coordinate organizations for the
administration of relief, including the Red Cross, the Salvation
Army, and “other relief or disaster assistance organizations,
which agree to operate under his advice or direction.”91 This
Coordinating Officer shall also “take such other action” he deems
necessary to “assist local citizens and public officials” in
obtaining assistance. 92

C. AT FIRST GLANCE, THE STAFFORD ACT
LOOKS “NECESSARY AND PROPER” UNDER
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND
At this point in the analysis, the Stafford Act appears a
legitimate expression of Congressional authority under Article I,
Section 8, clause 1. 93 It seems perfectly acceptable under the
necessary and proper clause and McCulloch v. Maryland’s
interpretation of that provision: The Act possesses the legitimate
end of serving the general welfare by aiding people during a
disaster, an appropriate means of empowering the president to
engage agencies to fulfill such aid and distribute resources
necessary for that aid, and it seems to comply with the “letter and
spirit” of the Constitution, which provides Congress with the
power to enact legislation to promote the general welfare. 94
My research does not reveal any challenges to Congress’s
power to enact the Stafford Act. Some scholars appear a little
unclear about the reliability of Congress’s authority to enact the
Stafford Act but do not inveigh against it. 95 Even those who argue
91. 42 U.S.C. § 5143(a), (b)(3) (2012).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 5143(b)(4) (2012).
93. See Harrison, supra note 15, at 1102, 1104.
94. See id. at 1102-106.
95. See Tucker & Bragg, III, supra note 79 at 861. (“The federal government has no
inherent police power. However, it may act pursuant to an expressly enumerated power in
the Constitution in situations that also permit simultaneous exercise of state police power.
Nevertheless, the federal government plays an important role in efforts to recover from
natural disasters, especially through various coordination activities and through fiscal relief
for disaster victims. The federal government acts in these situations through FEMA.”).
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against expanded FEMA authority over disasters do not contest
the Stafford Act’s essential legitimacy. 96 It is possible that an
enumerationist of the “Great Powers” stripe might argue that
saving lives in this way is a great power, and thus beyond the
ability of Congress to legislate absent Constitutional
amendment.97 However, under current environmental pressures,
which have seen the United States scalded and pummeled by fire
and flood throughout 2017-2018, it appears that the no real
argument against the Stafford Act based on Article I could
succeed.98 Most people seems ready to agree that the Stafford
Act is a necessary and proper law to fulfill Congress’s power of
serving the general welfare.
Nevertheless, from a race and class justice perspective, the
Stafford Act is not “proper” because it is not consistent with the
“letter and spirit”99 of Constitution’s promise of equal
protection.100 The Act insufficiently guides FEMA agents to
distribute aid in ways that are conscious of intersectional
problems,101 which have create an unequal distribution of disaster
aid between poor and minority communities like those in Puerto
Rico and those in Houston and Florida, as the 2017 hurricane
season revealed. 102

96. Ross C. Paolino, Is It Safe to Chevron “Two-Step” in A Hurricane? A Critical
Examination of How Expanding the Government’s Role in Disaster Relief Will Only
Exacerbate the Damage, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1394 (2008) (“This Essay examines
whether FEMA can interpret the Stafford Act to respond to the post-Katrina call for a
broader federal role in disaster relief. In answering this inquiry in the negative, this Essay
maintains that such an empowering interpretation will not receive Chevron deference.
Moreover, despite FEMA’s inept response to Hurricane Katrina, increasing federal disaster
power is not the solution, as the federal government already possesses the necessary power
to effectively respond to natural disasters.”).
97. See supra text accompanying note 16.
98. Somini Sengupta, 2018 Is Shaping Up to Be the Fourth-Hottest Year. Yet We’re
Still Not Prepared for Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (AUG. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/climate/summer-heat-global-warming.html
[https://perma.cc/U324-5PT9].
99. See supra note 11.
100. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
101. See text accompanying infra notes 172-92.
102. See infra note 164-66.
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III. FEMA’S FAILURE TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY
TO THE SUFFERING IN PUERTO RICO CAUSED
BY HURRICANE MARIA
In this section, I will relay the facts of Hurricane Maria’s
devastation of Puerto Rico, and the ways in which FEMA
response failed to meet the needs of Puerto Ricans because of
Agency ignorance of aid problems rooted in intersectionality.
On September 6, 2017, mere days after FEMA rendered a
“deep” and successful “life-saving mission” to recently stormwracked Houston, 103 Category 5 Hurricane Irma hovered north of
San Juan, Puerto Rico. 104 The island caught large gusts of rain
and 100-mile-per-hour winds.105 Four people were killed by Irma
on Puerto Rico. 106 Two-thirds of the island’s recipients of
electricity lost power. 107 34 percent of the islanders were cut off
from clean water supplies.108
Ten days later, on September 16, at 2:00 P.M. Atlantic
Standard Time, the National Weather Service classified an
African easterly wave moving across the tropical Atlantic Ocean
as a tropical depression moving 700 miles east-southeast of the
Lesser Antilles. 109 By September 17th, at 5 P.M., Maria
intensified to 75 mph, with sustained winds. 110 The Service
issued another advisory warning that the hurricane would achieve
landfall on Wednesday, September 20, by midday.111 FEMA
103. “We are deep into the life-saving mission,” Brock Long told Chuck Todd on
Meet the Press on August 27, 2017. See FEMA: We Are ‘Deep Into the Life-Saving Mission’
in Texas, NBC (AUG. 27, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/fema-weare-deep-into-the-life-saving-mission-in-texas-1033616451604
[https://perma.cc/4R4CVNY6].
104. Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening With the Relief Effort in Puerto Rico?, THE
ATLANTIC (OCT. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/whathappened-in-puerto-rico-a-timeline-of-hurricane-maria/541956/ [https://perma.cc/4MUTV2PK] [hereinafter, What’s Happening].
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Major Hurricane Maria - September 20, 2017, NATIONAL WEATHER
SERVICE (SEPT. 20, 2017), https://www.weather.gov/sju/maria2017 [https://perma.cc/7X347DUJ].
110. Id..
111. See What’s Happening, supra note 104.
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installed a Federal Coordinating Officer and an Incident
Management Assistance Team at the FEMA Distribution
Center,112 perhaps in Caugas,113 which is in Puerto Rico’s central
mountain range, 114 but more likely in San Juan. 115 On
Wednesday, September 20, Maria made landfall on the island
nation of Dominica, creating enormous destruction. 116 President
Trump issued an emergency declaration for Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands. 117 FEMA installed urban search and rescue and
canine teams and a “logistics package” on Puerto Rico. 118 The
rest of FEMA and federal personnel were located on St. Croix, in
the Virgin Islands. 119
On September 20, Hurricane Maria slammed into Puerto
Rico at 6:15 a.m., south of Yabucoa Harbor. 120 It possessed
maximum winds that reached 155 miles per hour, making it a
level 4 Hurricane, though just three miles short of Category 5
intensity.121 30 inches of rain fell and all island power was lost. 122
The U.S. Department of Defense issued a press release promising
that 430 National Guardsmen from the Virgin Islands would be
“called up” and that another “390 brought in from other states for
support will shelter in place to help in first
112. Overview of Federal Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Hurricane Maria,
(OCT. 31, 2017), https://www.fema.gov/blog/2017-09-29/overview-federal-effortsprepare-and-respond-hurricane-maria [https://perma.cc/9N7C-72C9] [hereinafter, Overview
of Federal Efforts].
113. Id. Though 11 distribution centers were installed eventually on the island, see
Rafael Bernal, FEMA: Puerto Rico situation has “improved significantly”, THE H ILL (SEPT.
28, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/352977-fema-puerto-rico-situationhas-improved-significantly [https://perma.cc/K529-Q4PR], FEMA identifies the Caugas
center as a main portal. See Fema Distribution Center Caguas Puerto Rico , FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/videos/148945 [https://perma.cc/25B6-RUFL].
114.
See
WELCOME
TO
P UERTO
RICO,
http://welcome.topuertorico.org/city/caguas.shtml [https://perma.cc/ULK6-GXTC].
115. See infra text accompanying notes 143-44 (describing how FEMA stayed in San
Juan).
116. See What’s Happening, supra note 104.
117. See Overview of Federal Efforts, supra note 112.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See What’s Happening, supra note 104; Hurricane Maria, NATIONAL
HURRICANE
CENTER
(SEPT.
17,
2017),
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2017/al15/al152017.discus.006.shtml?
[https://perma.cc/H6PV-H5ZV].
121. See What’s Happening, supra note 104.
122. Id.
FEMA
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response.”123 President Trump declared “that a major disaster
exists” in Puerto Rico and ordered Federal assistance to
Commonwealth and local recovery efforts, 124 triggering FEMA
relief exercises to be performed under the powers vested by the
Stafford Act.125
On September 21, 3,500 federal personnel were “on the
ground,” according to the FEMA website’s timeline, though it is
unclear how many investigators were sent to Puerto Rico as
opposed to St. Croix.126 We do know that two FEMA search and
rescue teams were engaging in “reconnaissance” activities
then.127 FEMA’s distribution center possessed 274,000 meals, 25
generators, and more than 500 cots. 128 On September 22, 7,000
federal employees, including 250 FEMA investigators, were “on
the ground in Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands.”129 National
Guard Bureau had 1,600 service members “in the U.S. Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico.”130 70 Federal law enforcement officers
traveled to San Juan, and three Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
response teams also made their way to the island. 131
But the aid effort began to stumble. On September 25,
FEMA tweeted that more than 10,000 federal staff had landed in
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, but it was unclear who was
where; moreover, this number in no way equaled the 31,000
123. See Juanita Philip & Jessica Barnett, National Guard Plans Relief Efforts as
Hurricane Maria Slams Puerto Rico, DEPT. OF DEFENSE (SEPT. 20, 2017),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1318026/national-guard-plans-reliefefforts-as-hurricane-maria-slams-puerto-rico/ [https://perma.cc/RT4P-UV2T].
124. President Donald J. Trump Approves Puerto Rico Disaster Declaration,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (SEPT. 21, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-approvespuerto-rico-disaster-declaration-2/ [https://perma.cc/G2Z6-HEJA].
125. FEMA is administered via the powers conferred by the Stafford Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5195 (2012). See John K. Pierre & Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical Look at
FEMA’s Failure to Provide Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters, 68 LA. L. REV. 443,
448 (2008) (“When catastrophic natural disasters occur, the principal federal statute
providing assistance to state and local governments, as well as to individuals, is
the Stafford Act. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is the federal agency principally charged to
care for Americans who are victims of natural disasters.”).
126. See Overview of Federal Efforts, supra note 112.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Overview of Federal Efforts, supra note 112.
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federal employees who were doing recovery in Houston “days”
after Hurricane Harvey hit on August 25; 132 and the more than
40,000 federal personnel who sped to Florida four days after
Hurricane Irma hit on September 10. 133
On September 29, President Trump seemed to signal that aid
would not be easy to deliver to Puerto Rico when he complained
to reporters that Puerto Rico was surrounded by water. 134 And
then, on September 30, he tweeted that Puerto Ricans were
ungrateful for the aid that they were allegedly receiving: “[They]
want everything to be done for them when it should be a
community effort. 10,000 Federal workers now on Island doing a
fantastic job,” he wrote. 135
Were they doing a “fantastic job?” FEMA responders, in
fact, were engaged in an uninspired effort that often failed the
people of Puerto Rico because agents had no concept of the
island’s intersectional dynamics. Among the many problems
plaguing the relief roll out, 136 federal responders did not take into
132. “We are deep into the life-saving mission,” Brock Long told Chuck Todd on
Meet the Press on August 27, 2017, see FEMA: We Are ‘Deep Into the Life-Saving Mission’
in Texas, NBC (AUG. 27, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/fema-weare-deep-into-the-life-saving-mission-in-texas-1033616451604
[https://perma.cc/PZ6KCTHR].
133. Eric Levenson, 3 storms, 3 responses: Comparing Harvey, Irma and Maria, CNN
(SEPT.
27,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/us/response-harvey-irmamaria/index.html [https://perma.cc/AX5H-XUP2].
134. Eliza Redman, Trump on Puerto Rican crisis: ‘This is an island surrounded by
water,
big
water,
ocean
water,’
BUS. INSIDER
(SEPT. 29, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-island-water-2017-9
[https://perma.cc/B87F-G7ZS].
135. Lisa Marie Segarra, Donald Trump: Puerto Rico Wants ‘Everything to Be Done
for Them,’ TIME (SEPT. 30, 2017), http://time.com/4963903/donald-trump-puerto-ricanleaders-want-everything-to-be-done-for-them/ [https://perma.cc/L4T3-2UW6]; Donald
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(SEPT. 30, 2017, 4:29 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/914089888596754434 [https://perma.cc/BDT683TX].
136. Alexia Fernández Campbell & Umair Irfan, Puerto Rico’s deal with Whitefish
was shady as hell, new records show, VOX (NOV. 15, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2017/11/15/16648924/puerto-rico-whitefish-contract-congress-investigation
[https://perma.cc/ND2L-PQ5W]. Six days after landfall, Puerto Rico’s power company,
PREPA, contracted with Whitefish Energy Holdings to restore energy to Puerto Rico’s
electrical grid, but Whitefish failed at its task. Id. Then, FEMA issued a $30M contract with
Bronze Star LLC to supply blue tarps to the island, but the supplies did not show up. See
Tami Abdollah & Michael Biesecker, Big contracts, no storm tarps for Puerto Rico,
SUNSENTINEL, (Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/fl-bz-floridacompany-storm-tarps-20171128-story.html [https://perma.cc/2VCX-2WWC].
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consideration the special needs of rural, mountain
communities:137 Agents who had made it Puerto Rico appeared to
remain in the safety of San Juan, Puerto Rico’s capital; 138 it is not
clear whether many FEMA and other responders’ reported
confinement to San Juan resulted from a confusion about who
would do what in the midst of the general chaos and also a
command structure that has been famous for its weaknesses since
Hurricane Katrina. 139 It may also be possible that the presence of
various military personnel and different agency responders and
volunteers imbued agents with “pluralistic ignorance,”140 that is,
the dulling of their imperative to venture past the safety of San
Juan to find victims in the island’s mountain regions; here, many
victims would go weeks without aid. 141 In any event, on October
9, 2017, Rachel Maddow reported that FEMA officials had
asserted that it was “not [their] job to distribute food and water in
Puerto Rico.”142 She also reported that FEMA agents appeared to
be laying low in San Juan, 143 a claim backed up Norbert Figueroa,
a Puerto Rican architect and blogger whom I interviewed in
November of 2017.144
News accounts and other interviews that I conducted with
survivors and responders additionally revealed the host of other
intersectional factors that were ignored by FEMA agents and so
led to a spiraling series of increasingly dangerous and lethal
137. See, e.g., infra notes 143-44.
138. See id.
139. See Deadly Warning, supra note 19, at 430 (observing that “[g]overnment
officials took insufficient actions or made poor decisions in the days immediately before and
after landfall,”); id. at 434-35 (observing a problem post-Katrina of coordination between
FEMA and the Department of Health and Human Services.).
140. KAREN S. JOHNSON-C ARTEE, NEWS NARRATIVES AND NEWS FRAMING:
CONSTRUCTING POLITICAL REALITY 36 (2005).
141. Samantha Schmidt & Arelis R. Hernandez, Trapped In the Mountains, Puerto
Ricans Don’t See Help, or a Way Out, WASH. POST (O CT. 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/trapped-in-the-mountains-puerto-ricans-dontsee-help-or-a-way-out/2017/10/01/7621867e-a647-11e7-ade176d061d56efa_story.html?utm_term=.5a7c6437320c [https://perma.cc/8PE7-TJPJ].
142. Rachel Maddow, FEMA: Not Our Job to Distribute Food and Water in Puerto
Rico, MSNBC (OCT. 9, 2017), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/watch/d-blockpuerto-rico-1067297859792?playlist=associated [https://perma.cc/DKL3-A9XQ].
143. Id. (“Nearly three weeks after Hurricane Maria, FEMA has not delivered food or
water to the [rural area] of Aibanito.”).
144. See Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 42 (saying “they made a hub” in San
Juan).
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feedback effects of the storm. Specifically, these news accounts
and interviews revealed that FEMA sent to Puerto Rico personnel
that 1) did not speak Spanish, 2) used technology to communicate
with victims even though poor Puerto Ricans did not have access
to intelligent devices and the power grid had been down since
September 20, 3) gave out food boxes containing items laden with
sugar and salt to victims with heart disease and diabetes, and 4)
could not foresee that the elderly would constitute an especially
vulnerable population, who would die as a result of lack of care
and power – often when their ventilators and other medical
equipment failed as a result of power loss. 145 That is, along with
rural identity, FEMA agents failed to recognize the importance of
other intersectional factors such as language, poverty, disability,
and elder status.146
These mistakes contributed to a catastrophe with a climbing
death toll: Though President Trump claimed a “low” body count
of 16 people on October 3,147 this number would later be raised to
64,148 and then, in December of 2017, to an unofficial count of
1,052,149 which was then raised to between 800-8,000 in May of
2018 by a Harvard study, 150 and approximately 2,975 by the

145. See Nishant Kishore et al., Mortality in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria, 379
NEW ENG. J. MED. 162, 165-66 (2018) (“Considerable disruptions to medical services were
reported . . . across all categories irrespective of remoteness, with 31% of households
reporting an issue . . . . The most frequently reported problems were an inability to access
medications (14.4% of households) and the need for respiratory equipment requiring
electricity (9.5%).”).
146. See supra notes 31-35 (discussing intersectional status that touch on these
identities).
147. Frances Robles et al., Official Toll in Puerto Rico: 64. Actual Deaths May Be
1,052,
N.Y.
TIMES
(DEC.
9,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/08/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-deathtoll.html [https://perma.cc/6SW8-GFUU].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Kishore et al, surpa note 145; see also Sheri Fink, Puerto Rico’s Hurricane
Maria Death Toll Could Exceed 4,000, New Study Estimates, N.Y. TIMES (MAY 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/us/puerto-rico-deathshurricane.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news
[https://perma.cc/7TFU-3D87] (“Because the number of households surveyed was relatively
small in comparison to the population’s size, the true number of deaths beyond what was
expected could range from about 800 to more than 8,000 people, the researchers’ calculations
show.”).
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Puerto Rican government in August of 2018. 151 The majority of
these casualties were caused by “interruptions” to health care.” 152
Interruptions were caused by “disruptions in basic utilities,” such
as electricity, 153 and also appear have been exacerbated by shock
and confusion over the federal government’s failure to help the
elderly and those in rural communities, communicate to residents
in an understood language, provide nontoxic food (and water) that
was sufficient in quantity, and use available communication
systems instead of Twitter. 154 As proof of this exacerbation, one
of my interviewee relayed that aides to patients in eldercare
institutions fled155—a reaction that was seen throughout the
island, which disgorged a rapid mainland exodus of 73,000 to
over 200,000 souls by October. 156
This self-evacuation
contributed to loss of life: New York Magazine reported that
some hospital deaths were caused by a paucity of staff 157 and the
151. Puerto Rico Increases Hurricane Maria Death Toll to 2,975, BBC (AUG. 29,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45338080 [https://perma.cc/3UVRXV9Q].
152. See Kishore et al, supra note 145.
153. Id. at 169: (“Chronically ill patients are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in
basic utilities, which highlights the need for these patients, their communities, and their
providers to have contingency plans during and after disasters.”).
154. See Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 26-27 (rounding up complaints against
FEMA agents).
155. Id. at 30 (during the interview with Professor Maria Jimenez Colón, she stated,
“they never came back”).
156. Mark Moore, Thousands have fled Puerto Rico for Florida since
Hurricane Maria, N.Y. POST (OCT. 26, 2017),
https://nypost.com/2017/10/26/thousands-have-fled-puerto-rico-for-florida-sincehurricane-maria/ [https://perma.cc/EPG9-NANV] (estimating more than 73,000 Puerto
Rican residents fled to Florida); Florida SERT (@FLSERT), , TWITTER (DEC. 21, 2017),
https://twitter.com/FLSERT/status/943919645714731015 [https://perma.cc/72WV-ED8B]
(“Since Oct. 3rd, more than 269,000 individuals have arrived in Florida from Puerto Rico
through @FlyTPA @MCO and @iflymia”). See also e.g., Sara Ruiz-Grossman, The Ones
They Left Behind: A Puerto Rican Family Still Torn Apart Months After Maria, HUFFPOST
(FEB. 8, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/puerto-rico-families-separatedhurricane-maria-months-later_us_5a7a3d7ee4b07af4e81ee579
[https://perma.cc/AD87NVPN] (“An exact number of how many people left the island due to the damage is not
available yet, but more than 200,000 Puerto Ricans have sought refuge in Florida alone.
Many were families like the Núñez family, forced to only send some members away ― a
child after a school lost power, or a sick spouse after a hospital wasn’t running ― not
knowing when, or where, they’d reunite.”).
157. Mattahias Schwartz, Maria’s Bodies, N.Y. MAGAZINE (DEC. 22, 2017),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/12/hurricane-maria-man-made-disaster.html
[https://perma.cc/KLT5-Q8W9] (“At least two patients died at a hospital near San Juan when
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Harvard study reflected that the death toll waxed into the
thousands because “many households also reported problems
with closed medical facilities (8.6%) or absent doctors
(6.1%).”158
Meanwhile, there was a growing social recognition that
Puerto Rico was not receiving equal protection of the laws. CNN
reported that Texas received a deployment of 31,000 FEMA
investigators and National guardsmen, and a FEMA supply of 3
million meals and 3 million liters, and Florida received 40,000
federal personnel, including 2,650 FEMA staff, and 6.6 million
meals and 4.7 million liters of water, whereas 10,000 federal
responders were distributed across Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands.159 As I relate in Epistemic Injustice in Puerto Rico,
complaints about inequality were also made by my interviewees,
who were resident Professor Maria Jimenez Colon, 160 L.A.-based
nurse Sophia Hau Yau, 161 Brooklyn-based nurse Roxanna
Garcia,162 and resident Norbert Figueroa. 163 Further, news outlets
like Politico lambasted an apparent “double standard,”164 which

there weren’t enough staff on hand to operate the pumps, a doctor who was present told
me.”).
158. See Kishore et al, surpa note 145, at 166.
159. See Levenson, supra note 133.
160. Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 29 (“. . . and they cannot just walk in and
start giving instructions without any special consideration for the reality of our
circumstances, which may be different from what they find in Texas. But the law does not
distinguish between Texas and Puerto Rico.”) (statement of Maria Jimenez Colon).
161. Id. at 35 (“You know, all the citizens should be equal, but that’s not what I’m
seeing. They’re not putting enough effort in Puerto Rico compared to the other states where
there have been disasters.”) (statement of Sophia Hau Yau, RN).
162. Id. at 39 (“The [reason why this went down so badly is] socioeconomic
discrimination, mostly because of Puerto Rico’s position prior to the hurricane. It was
already 70 billion [dollars in] debt, and the U.S. didn’t feel the need to invest in something
that’s already messed up to begin with. FEMA’s own data shows a . . . discrepancy between
[their treatment of Texas after Harvey and Puerto Rico.]”) (statement of Roxanna Garcia,
RN).
163. Id. at 43 (“I don’t want to say, ‘hey there is discrimination.’ Personally, I will
say yes, there was some. But I don’t have anything to substantiate that. It’s all perspective.
It’s what I’m seeing compared to the response to other places like states, [such as Texas or
Florida.], which was active and supportive. But the message and the actions from the
government was versus [Texas or Florida.]”) (statement of Norbert Figueroa).
164. Danny Vinik, How Trump favored Texas Over Puerto Rico, POLITICO (MAR. 27,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/27/donald-trump-fema-hurricane-mariaresponse-480557 [https://perma.cc/8GNK-L5U5].
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would later be borne out when death tolls from Houston and
Florida came out, at the highest, in the low hundreds. 165
But perhaps the greatest expression of this anxiety came on
September 29, when San Juan Mayor Carmen Yulin Cruz
expressed the frustration and anguish caused by a growing
awareness that a shocking and deadly kind of discrimination was
taking place: During a press conference she said, “We are dying
here,” and “I cannot fathom the thought that the greatest nation in
the world cannot figure out logistics for a small island . . . I am
asking the President of the United States to make sure somebody
is in charge that is up to the task of saving lives . . . [I]f we don’t
get the food and water into peoples’ hands what we are going to
see is something close to a genocide.” 166

IV. THE STAFFORD ACT IS IMPROPER BECAUSE
IT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY RECOGNITION OF
INTERSECTIONALITY, A LACUNA THAT PROVED
LETHAL AND PROMOTED INEQUALITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE MARIA
FEMA’s devastating and unequal response was caused by
the Agency’s failure to recognize intersectionality: agents did not
perceive, or respond to, the fact that many Puerto Ricans spoke
Spanish, experienced poverty, disability, high blood pressure, and
diabetes, did not possess technology or technological training,
and lived without adequate transportation in mountainous
communities.167 In Epistemic Injustice, I describe how these
forms of cognitive blindness constituted acts of what philosopher
Miranda Fricker describes as epistemic injustice, particularly,
testimonial injustice: This form of offense occurs when people in
power do not regard vulnerable populations as source of

165. See Moravec, supra note 40; Mains, supra note 40 (describing the 90 deaths
suffered in Florida due to 2017 Hurricane Irma).
166. See Jeremy B. White, ‘Something close to genocide’: San Juan mayor Carmen
Yulin Cruz begs for more Puerto Rico relief, THE INDEPENDENT (SEPT. 29, 2017),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/puerto-rico-crisis-latestsan-juan-genocide-mayor-beg-carmen-yulin-cruz-aid-relief-a7975021.html
[https://perma.cc/XM9S-U28R].
167. Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 26-27.

190

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:1

knowledge or authority, 168 though Fricker maintains that we may
train ourselves out of the habits of testimonial injustice by
listening to narratives and committing to self-critical cognitive
practices.169 In Puerto Rico, if Agency actors had gathered
narratives before and during the disaster, they would have had
necessary information to implement the act in ways that respond
adequately to the victims. Perhaps they would also have raised
their own consciousnesses, and not idled away in San Juan,
seemingly embroiled in pluralistic ignorance. But they did not.
Why not?170 One reason may be that the Stafford Act
contains insufficient mandates to become aware of, or respond to,
168. Id. at 64. As Fricker explains, testimonial injustice exists where a person “is
wronged ‘in their capacity as a subject of social understanding’ – for example, where a
person giving testimony, on account of discrimination, is understood by a hearer not to be
credible.” Id. “Testimonial justice may be active or passive: It may either exist in the habits
of listening to a person give testimony, or, it may occur ‘preemptively,’ where the person ‘is
never solicited; so the speaker is silenced by the identity prejudice that undermines her
credibility in advance. Thus purely structural operations of identity power can control whose
would-be contributions become public, and whose do not.’” Id.
169. On Fricker’s commitment to storytelling as a way to escape the harms of
epistemic injustice, see Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21 at 65; MIRANDA FRICKER,
EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND ETHICS OF KNOWING 148-51 (2009). On her
commitment to self-critique, see id. at 84; Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 64-65.
170. It could be argued that FEMA agents were simply being negligent in their
administration of the Stafford Act, and that any legal response should rely upon a lawsuit
seeking to have a court set aside FEMA’s decision as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also
Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. U.S. E.P.A., 90 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1197 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
A court will find that an administrative agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously if “the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Dioxin/Organochlorine
Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1521; see also Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 44 (1983).
Did FEMA fail to take into consideration an “important aspect of the problem?” Id. at 43.
FEMA may reply that did not so fail, but was operating within the straightened circumstances
occasioned by a hurricane season that had already seen two major storms hit the United
States and its territories, and that it was simply doing its best with the resources available to
it and, yes, the logistics that created such high obstacles. There is a good chance that such
an argument would be agreed with by courts. The standard or review is “highly deferential,
presume[s] the agency action to be valid and requires affirming the agency action if a
reasonable basis exists for its decision.” Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072,
1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal punctuation omitted). Courts will affirm the agency’s decision
if it articulates a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor
Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. The court’s deference will be “highest when reviewing
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the intersectional problems experienced by subordinated
communities. This omission renders the Act “improper” from a
race and class reading of the letter and spirit of the Constitution’s
promise of equal protection. 171
It must be said that there are some citations of intersectional
factors in the Act: While there is no specific mention of “gender,”
“poverty,” “women,” or “sexual orientation,” the Stafford Act
does provide that disaster assistance be distributed without
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, nationality,
sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or economic status. 172
There is a provision for unemployment assistance for low-income
migrants and seasonal workers who find themselves in need after
a disaster.173 In addition, applications of public housing
assistance are giving priority, 174 low-income people who have
been deprived of “nutritious food” may be eligible for allotments
for as long as the President deems it necessary, 175 and low-income
people may also be eligible for legal assistance. 176 Disabled
people receive attention: Those whose homes have been rendered
inaccessible are eligible for housing assistance, 177 the FEMA
administrator must distribute information in ways that can be
accessed by people with disabilities, 178 mass evacuation plans that
are implemented must be address the needs of the elderly and
disabled,179 and the Administrator shall appoint a disability
an agency’s technical analyses and judgments involving the evaluation of complex scientific
data within the agency’s technical expertise.” League of Wilderness Defenders Blue
Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Ctr.
For Biological Diversity v. U.S. E.P.A., 90 F. Supp. 3d at 1197. While the “logistics”
argument may not be scientific per se, it does engage the technical expertise of FEMA actors.
Nevertheless, the cognitive blindness that FEMA agents demonstrated here could be seen by
many rational actors as an expression of arbitrariness and capriciousness. See Epistemic
Injustice, supra note 21 at 48 (describing Cass Sunstein’s concept of cognitive
unavailability).
171. See supra note 38 (noting that critical race feminists see a state failure to engage
intersectionality as a problem of equal protection).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 5151 (2012).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 5177(a) (2012).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 5153 (2012).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 5179(a)-(b) (2012).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 5182 (2012).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 5174 (2012).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 5196f(a)(2)(b) (2012).
179. 7 U.S.C. § 321a(b)(5) (2012).
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coordinator.180 Further, the Administrator shall embark upon
national training programs that seek to, among other things,
prepare readiness for populations with “special needs,” including
the elderly.181 Also, the Act calls for the Administrator to take into
account population groups with limited English proficiency when
planning for an emergency or major disaster, ensure that
information is made “available” to these groups, and to create a
“clearinghouse of model language assistance programs and best
practices for State and local governments in providing services
related to a major disaster or emergency.” 182
So what’s the problem? For all of these citations of
intersectional characteristics, Maria proved that the Stafford Act
is still not proper from a race and class liberationist perspective,
because it did not guide federal actors on how to distribute aid
conscious of those characteristics. The Stafford Act does not
contain provisions recognizing how race, class, and their
manifold consequences – disease, lack of technology – prove key
factors in disaster responses and Stafford Act implementation.
For example, the Stafford Act could establish that “nutritious
food” needed to be defined with poverty and its correlates of
diabetes and hypertension in mind. 183 The Stafford Act could
have also been written to inform FEMA coordinators and
inspectors that they have a duty to do more than just distribute
applications for aid, 184 or stay in place in their resource centers, 185
but rather, must tailor the delivery of medical care, housing, and
water to people who are outside of metropolitan areas – which
would add rural intersectional consciousness to the Act. 186 In
addition, requiring the Administrator to “ensure” 187 that
information would be made available to victims in their languages

180. 6 U.S.C. § 321b (2012).
181. 6 U.S.C. § 748(b)(2)(A)(v) (2012).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 5196f(a)(1)-(3) (2012).
183. See Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 12 (describing problems of
hypertension and diabetes in Puerto Rico).
184. See id. at 34 (quoting Sophia Hau Yau, RN, as saying “People would wait for 20
hours for help [from FEMA, by standing in lines. And] all they got when they got into the
gate were an application and 2 bottles of water.”).
185. See id.
186. See generally supra note 32 (citing work on rural intersectionality).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 5196f(a)(2) (2012).
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and to create a “clearinghouse” 188 does not also “ensure” that
agents speak the population’s language when it communicates
with them in life-saving situations, nor does not mandate that they
work reasonably hard to discover ways to get translators to help.
There are other, more audacious, interpolations that might
have also been included. The Stafford Act could require that
every single person in DHS be trained about the phenomenon of
unconscious bias, 189 how to recognize it, and how to combat it
within themselves and in others when engaged in their job of
disaster assistance. Further, while the Stafford Act provides that
aid will not be distributed discriminatorily, the Act could have set
forth what that means precisely: The Act could have established
that in its training protocols 190 agents would learn that
“discrimination” exists when they assume that everyone lives
exactly the same way, and that discrimination also occurs when
the agents fail to acquire on-the-ground narratives about the
language spoken, the living patterns, and the sites of particular
vulnerability (elderly, the disabled) and react to that information,
rather than staying in safe harbor of cities. In general, the Act
could require that FEMA engage in narrative gathering about
subordinated communities that experience predictable heavy
weather, hurricanes, fires, etc., before disasters befall those areas.
As I will discuss in a bit, 191 these suggestions would require a
recognition of critical race theory’s famous narrative method 192
within the Act itself.
A proviso is in order here: I recognize that the level of
statutory specificity that I am calling for seems at odds with the
ordinary practices of legislative codification, and imposes duties
that are not necessarily supported by our legal culture.193 It is true
that some legislatures have taken pains to require that actors

188. See 42 U.S.C. § 5196f(a)(3) (2012).
189. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335 (1987).
190. See, e.g., infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
191. See text preceding infra note 222.
192. See infra note 226.
193. See, e.g., c.f., Zelig v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1128 (2002)
(“[P]olice officers. . . like other persons, generally may not be held liable in damages for
failing to take affirmative steps to come to the aid of, or prevent an injury to, another person.
As a rule, one has no duty to come to the aid of another.”).
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exercise special care to tailor their judgment to specific
populations where the dangers at stake are considered exigent.
For example, a 2018 California Assembly Bill addressing opioid
addiction provides that the Heroine and Public Education
program shall engage “educational themes and messages that are
tailored to appeal to different target audiences, and us[e]
culturally and linguistically appropriate means.”194 And North
Carolina’s Public Health Law provides that anti-diabetes
programs “shall be tailored to the population the entity serves and
must establish measurable goals and objectives.” 195
Nevertheless, I acknowledge my critique of the Stafford Act does
push in a race- and class-conscious, lived experience-conscious,
duty-filled direction that requires Congress to make specific
ukases concerning implementation – and thus contrasts with most
legislative action. As such, my suggestions here are of a piece
with other CRT complaints about federal laws’ inattention to the
granular aspects of intersectionality, made most famously by
Kimberlé Crenshaw about the domestic waiver enacted by
Congress to the marriage fraud provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which failed to recognize the lived impediments
experienced by immigrant women. 196
But other dilemmas also abound: Even if this language had
been included in the Act, would this create equality during
disaster aid roll outs? As noted above, the Act does contain
mandates against discrimination, 197 and it provides forms of
assistance for poor people, migrants, seasonal workers, and
disabled and elderly people, and people with special needs. 198 Yet
during Hurricane Maria, all of this turned out to be so much
palaver that did not stop thousands of deaths of people with
intersectional identities. 199

194. Assemb. B. 2174, Cal. Leg., 2017—18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-221.1 (2014).
196. See Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1248 (“Tina Shum, a family counselor at a social
service agency, points out that ‘[t]his law sounds so easy to apply, but there are cultural
complications in the Asian community that make even these requirements difficult. . . . Just
to find the opportunity and courage to call us is an accomplishment for many.’”).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 5151 (2012).
198. See supra notes 172-78.
199. See supra note 150.
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Perhaps, then, the Stafford Act could really only be made
proper if it the people saddled with the job of executing it
determined to do so in a way that demonstrated a real commitment
to equal justice. After all, the whole point of delegation to
agencies is to ensure that complex problems be dealt with by
experts.200 So endowed with the resources and proficiency to
accomplish this fine-tuned work, the Agency itself stands in the
best position to make the constitutional commitment to equally
distribute disaster aid to poor and intersectional communities.
Though the judiciary now, through its interpretation of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,201 and
its failure to recognize a constitutional claim based on most state
failures to aid, 202 indicates that misbegotten aid distribution does

200. See supra note 53.
201. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
202. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989), the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposed no affirmative obligation on a state to protect an individual from harm. The Court,
however, recognized an exception: The guarantee of due process might impose such an
obligation when the government has taken action that renders the individual “more
vulnerable” to harm than he or she would otherwise have been. Id. at 200-201. It is possible
that this exception is triggered here, given that the government, in essence, created a
reasonable expectation that it would provide competent and effective aid to all victims of
natural disasters. In failing to meet that expectation, it made Puerto Ricans “more vulnerable”
to harm caused by Maria than they would have been in the absence of that
expectation. See Olympia Duhart, Blowing the Lid Off: Expanding the Due Process Clause
to Defend the Defenseless Against Hurricane Katrina, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 411, 430
(2007). Yet, given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), beyond its established
contexts, see Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (refusing to extend Bivens beyond its
established contexts), and given the Court’s aggressive approach to the qualified immunity
defense, see, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305
(2015), it seems unlikely that the Court would endorse a Bivens remedy here. The seeds of
such a claim are evident, however, and perhaps on these facts a foundation could be laid for
a future jurisprudence of due process. Surely when FEMA represented to the public that it
went “deep” into the “life-saving mission” in Texas on late August, see FEMA: We Are
‘Deep
Into
the
Life-Saving
Mission’
in
Texas, NBC
(AUG.
27,
2017),https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/fema-we-are-deep-into-the-lifesaving-mission-in-texas-1033616451604 [https://perma.cc/7XH6-K77S], it created a
reasonable expectation in Puerto Ricans of aid and protection that would be timely, logistical,
and addressed to the needs of that specific community. Instead, FEMA leadership and its
agents exacerbated the risk of harm to Puerto Ricans by displaying a callous disregard for
the realities of Puerto Rico, and thus arbitrarily depriving Puerto Ricans of their
constitutionally protected rights of life, liberty, and property.
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not raise equal protection problems, the Agency could itself
recognize that it does. It could embrace its role as a possessor of
a constitutional duty, under the Fifth Amendment’s equal
protection clause, to give equal in fact disaster aid to poor and
minority communities. In doing so, it would have to take care to
absorb intersectional realities, and narratives, of those
communities.
Having learned from Puerto Rico, then, that is what the
Agency should be prepared to do in the future: Embrace an
intersectional consciousness, and engage in narrative gathering,
as an agentic expression of its duties under the equal protection
clause of the Fifth Amendment.
That is, the Agency should begin to embody a critical
administrative constitutionalism.

V. FEMA SHOULD LIVE OUT THE LETTER AND
SPIRIT OF EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE
EXECUTION OF ITS AID EFFORTS BY
EMBODYING CRITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
In this section, I will adumbrate the theory of administrative
constitutionalism, discuss the ways in which critical race theory
and other anti-subordination theories may be joined with that
theory in a critical administrative constitutionalism enterprise,
and engage its possible applications by FEMA actors under the
auspices of the Stafford Act.

Note, however, that the President and federal legislators would enjoy absolute immunity.
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982); Eastland v. U. S. Servicemen’s Fund,
421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). I am indebted for help from my colleague and friend, Allan Ides.
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A. THE THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Administrative constitutionalists recognize that agency
actors may live out the principles of due process and equal
protection in the way that they interpret and execute their duties.
In this section, I refer to the scholars Gillian Metzger,203 William
Eskridge and John Ferejohn, 204 Sophia Z. Lee,205 and Karen
Tani,206 who have done much to invent this theory. As Metzger
explains, “administrative constitutionalism . . . encompasses the
elaboration
of
new
constitutional
understandings
by administrative actors, as well as the construction (or
‘constitution’) of the administrative state through structural and
substantive measures.”207 She also describes this as constitutional
“norm entrepreneur[ship].”208 Eskridge and Ferejohn similarly
describe
administrative
constitutionalism
as
small
constitutionalism, or “small c” dynamics that shape
administrative decisions, wherein agency decisionmakers engage
“political pressures” that lead to “higher-level deliberation” –
such as in the case of the EEOC’s 1972 decision that pregnancy
discrimination was sex discrimination. 209
Lee teaches us that administrative constitutionalism involves
“[a]dministrators creatively extend[ing] or narrow[ing] court
doctrine in the absence of clear, judicially defined rules.”210 In
her book, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL
TO THE NEW RIGHT, she recounts how, in the 1960’s, the National
Labor Relations Board’s Howard Jenkins and other agents began
to push for a “liberal workplace constitution” that would construe
unions’ acts of racial discrimination as unfair labor practices. 211
She also details how, in the 1970’s, NLRB Chairman Edward
203. See Metzger, supra note 5, at 1900.
204. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF S TATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 31 (2010).
205. See Lee, supra note 61, at 801-02.
206. See supra note 63.
207. Metzger, supra note 5, at 1900.
208. Id. at 1905.
209. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 204, at 31.
210. See Lee, supra note 61, at 801-02.
211. SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE
NEW RIGHT 137-38, 148 (2014).
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Miller pursued a vision of administrative power that was
constrained by the Constitution’s guarantees of equality, and so
prohibited the Board from, either directly or indirectly,
sanctioning private discrimination. 212
Karen Tani traces administrative constitutionalism’s “rights
pioneer[ing]”213 and, like Lee, illustrates it through historical
incident. She finds this brand of constitutionalism in the 1930’s
example of the Social Security Administration’s A. Delafield
Smith, who “preached” that poor relief was a “matter of right,”
and codified this understanding of human rights in training guides
for local welfare workers.214 As this example illustrates, Tani has
demonstrated the ways in which anti-racist and anti-classist
consciousness motivated administrative constitutionalism.
Furthermore, she has also documented the ways in which feminist
consciousness, and women’s use of “rights language”215
influenced the U.S. Department of Education’s efforts to
eradicate sexual violence on campuses through its issuance of
“Revised Guidance” communications in 2001, 216 and its “Dear
Colleague” letters that it sent in 2011. 217 Tani notes that these
administrative developments were linked to insights about rape
culture developed by theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon and
anthropologist Peggy Sanday. 218 That is, Tani’s work teaches us
that race liberationist thought, and feminist legal theory and
feminist consciousness, penetrated administrative processes to
create legal change. 219
212. Id. at 179.
213. See An Administrative Right, supra note 63, at 1854.
214. See Welfare and Rights, supra note 63, at 319 (“Drafted primarily by professional
social workers with the clearance of lawyers, these guides enumerated rights apart from a
basic guarantee of income support that, with the creation of federal-state welfare
programming, were now established in law. These included the right to submit a formal
application for assistance, the right to receive fair treatment, the right to spend support
payments freely, and the right to keep private one’s reliance on the state.”).
215. See An Administrative Right, supra note 63, at 1902.
216. Id. at 1864.
217. Id. at 1874.
218. Id. at 1870.
219. Id. at 1900-901 (“Thanks in large part to OCR’s efforts, numerous colleges and
universities have now translated . . . [a] natural law claim into something more like positive
law.”).
Other important work on administration constitutionalism, and its potential for creating new
rights, will be found in Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95
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B. JOINING ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM WITH CRT’S COMMITMENT
TO RACE AND CLASS AND OTHER
INTERSECTIONAL FORMS OF JUSTICE, AND ITS
AFFILIATED METHODS OF NARRATIVE
GATHERING AND SELF-CRITIQUE
In the context of Puerto Rico and hurricane Maria, we see
that there is a need to further the work of introducing antisubordination thought – specifically, critical race feminism, queer
legal theory, and disability theories, and their engagements with
intersectionality220 — into the theory of administrative
constitutionalism. In order to guard against the epistemic harms
that ravaged the people of Puerto Rico in September of 2017,
moreover, there is also a need to incorporate this body of theory’s
two key and related practices, being engaging narrative method
and committing to self-critique,221 into the concept of
administrative constitutionalism and its embodiment.
In a post-Maria United States, administrative
constitutionalism would require that Agency actors elaborate a
new constitutional understanding that failure to provide disaster
aid equally to poor minority communities and wealthier and
whiter ones is a violation of their duties to provide equal
protection of the laws under the Stafford Act. 222 Such a
comprehension would have to accompany a recognition of the
meaning and effects of intersectionality as it pertains to disaster
impact and response.223

B.U. L. REV. 519, 564 (2015) (“supplementing judicial constitutionalism with constitutional
experimentation between administrative and judicial constitutional applications can lead to
adaptation that is more responsive to changing societal contexts”) and Max Isaacs, LGBT
Rights and the Administrative State, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2012, 2038 (2017) (“agencies are
justified in their robust enforcement of LGBT rights where these rights have been
underenforced in the judicial and legislative branches.”).
220. See supra notes 31-36.
221. See infra notes 224-31.
222. See supra notes 160-65 (observing that this is the community’s interpretation of
what happened).
223. See id. (detailing how intersectionality ignorance led to disaster).
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“Intersectionality,” or what is sometimes also called
“multidimensionality,”224 is a concept rooted in a critical race
feminist consciousness,225 and it comes equipped with a method,
that of narrative gathering and dispersal. 226 Critical theories of
race, gender, disability and sexuality resist “univocal” stories of
law and justice, 227 and foster, instead a “multivocal” 228 practice
that seeks out the underclass’s full participation in
law. Importantly, its practitioners have long worried about
training themselves out of the patterns of epistemic injustice that
Miranda Fricker writes about, as they engage in storytelling 229 as
well as interrogations of their own assumptions in energized
engagements of self-critique,230 so as to “avoid [the] cultural
imperialism that perpetuates the supremacies promoted by the
colonial power.”231
224.
Darren
Lenard
Hutchinson, Identity
Crisis:
“Intersectionality,”
“Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 309-10 (2001) (“Multidimensionality ‘recognize[s] the inherent
complexity of systems of oppression . . . and the social identity categories around which
social power and disempowerment are distributed.’ Multidimensionality posits that the
various forms of identity and oppression are ‘inextricably and forever intertwined’ and that
essentialist equality theories ‘invariably reflect the experiences of class- and race-privileged’
individuals. Multidimensionality, therefore, arises out of and is informed by intersectionality
theory.”).
225. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Reconsideration: Intersectionality and the Future of
Critical Race Theory, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1247, 1257-259 (2011) (linking all three concepts).
226. See INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL R ACE FEMINISM 3 (Adrien Katherine Wing
eds., 1997) (“CRT’s critique of society thus often takes the form of storytelling and narrative
analysis — to construct alternative social realities and protest against acquiescence to unfair
arrangements designed to benefit others.”); see also Delgado, supra note 225.
227. See, e.g., Philip N. Meyer, Introduction: Will You Please Be Quiet, Please?
Lawyers Listening to the Call of Stories, 18 VT. L. REV. 567, 570 (1994) (“Our communities
are multivocal. The law, however, speaks univocally, and systematically excludes the voices
and stories of those who ought to be included in the community of authoritative speech. The
study of stories provides models for a legal discourse that can achieve a multivocal
community.”).
228. Id.
229. On Fricker’s commitment to storytelling as a way to escape the harms of
epistemic injustice, see Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 65; FRICKER , supra note 169,
at 148-51.
230. See Robert S. Chang & Natasha Fuller, Performing LatCrit, 33 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1277, 1289 (2000) (describing the “importance of self-reflection and self-critique to
protect against inadvertent reenactments of the kinds of subordination we claim to be
working against.”). On Fricker’s commitment to self-interrogation, see FRICKER, supra note
169, at 64-65.
231. Pedro A. Malavet, Outsider Citizenships and Multidimensional Borders: The
Power and Danger of Not Belonging, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 321, 327 (2005).
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This critical administrative constitutionalism would
mandate, then, that FEMA’s agents challenge their own
assumptions,232 come to grips with their own colonial points of
view,233 and begin to gather multivocal narratives about
vulnerable populations’ life ways and intersectional problems and
dynamics 234 in order to best plan for the next disaster and ensure
that equal protection be delivered to vulnerable victims.
A review of the Stafford Act and FEMA policies reveals that
there are spaces already within the law where this kind of work
could be done during a disaster, and before it happens.

1. How Could FEMA Actors Engage With Critical
Administrative Constitutionalism under the Stafford
Act?
Narrative gathering and the cultivation of intersectional
consciousness may proceed in the direct aftermath of a disaster
under The Stafford Act: As mentioned above, 235 the law permits
federal agencies to use experts and consultants, and to prioritize
the hiring of local people when responding to a disaster.236 These
local people, consulted in the immediate fallout of a natural event,
could tell federal responders who needs help, and how to help
them, thus alerting agents to intersectional issues of which they
might be unaware.
Once there has been a disaster declaration, the Stafford Act
also requires that the President appoint a federal coordinating
officer to operate in the affected area 237 and to coordinate with
232. See supra notes 230-31.
233. See id.
234. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 89-90.
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 5149(b)(2) (2012) (allowing responding federal agencies “to
employ experts and consultants in accordance with the provisions of section 3109 of such
title, without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such
title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.”); 42 U.S.C. § 5150(a) (“In the
expenditure of Federal funds for debris clearance, distribution of supplies, reconstruction,
and other major disaster or emergency assistance activities which may be carried out by
contract or agreement with private organizations, firms, or individuals, preference shall be
given, to the extent feasible and practicable, to those organizations, firms, and individuals
residing or doing business primarily in the area affected by such major disaster or
emergency.”).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 5143(a) (2012).
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organizations that agree to operate under his advice or
direction,238 as well as take other action he deems necessary to
provide local citizens and public officials with assistance. 239
Narrative gathering in real time would qualify as such
“coordination.”240 In addition, FEMA has a program where it
permits local individuals and government organizations to apply
for funding for specific hazard mitigation projects once a disaster
has been declared; with some outreach, this program could
transform into a measure by which FEMA operatives discover
critical information, through narrative acquisition, about who
needs what when and how to get it to them. 241 Again, the
gathering and absorption of these narratives would help increase
intersectional consciousness and dispel the epistemic injustice 242
and pluralistic ignorance and unconscious bias that worked so
disastrously in Puerto Rico. 243
Information gathering may also be engaged in before
disasters strikes under current FEMA’s existing “Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Grant Program,”244 which “awards planning and
project grants and provides opportunities for raising public
awareness about reducing future losses before disaster strikes.” 245
Further, FEMA has an extensive training program, including
a Diversity Awareness Course 246 and a Civil Rights and FEMA

238. 42 U.S.C. § 5143(b)(3) (2012).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 5143(b)(4) (2012).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 5143(b)(4) (2012). Again, according to the FEMA website, on Sept.
17, “FEMA ha[d] an FCO [Federal Coordinating Officer] and Incident Management
Assistance Team co-located with key staff from the Caribbean Area Division at the FEMA
Distribution Center in Puerto Rico, who would remain in place throughout the storm’s
potential landfall.” Overview of Federal Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Hurricane
Maria, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/blog/2017-09-29/overview-federal-efforts-prepareand-respond-hurricane-maria [https://perma.cc/U32B-NZF7].
241. Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/hazardmitigation-grant-program [https://perma.cc/MQU8-R3JY].
242. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (defining testimonial injustice).
243. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (addressing pluralistic ignorance).
244. Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/predisaster-mitigation-grant-program [https://perma.cc/9Y9J-CDEA].
245. Id.
246.
IS-20.18:
Diversity
Awareness
Course
2018,
FEMA,
https://training.fema.gov/IS/courseOverview.aspx?code=IS-20.18 [https://perma.cc/6L3SPF9V].

2019

WHAT FEMA SHOULD DO

203

Disaster Assistance course, 247 which, if adapted to critical race
theory concerns, could introduce FEMA agents to the concepts of
intersectionality, strenuous self-critique, and narrative
gathering.248
The type of critical administrative constitutionalism that I
am calling for raises a high standard for satisfaction, and one that
would take a great deal of energy and commitment to fulfill.
FEMA’s culture, training, and procedures would have to change
to accommodate intersectional consciousness and critical
narrative gathering.
A review of FEMA’s self-analysis post-Maria, and its
training protocols, however, reveal that this goal is very far from
happening right now.

VI. FEMA BEARS NO SIGN OF EMBRACING
CRITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURE OR DUTIES
The federal government has not risen to this challenge of
critical administrative constitutionalism in the wake of Hurricane
Maria. While the Department of Homeland Security can be
criticized for many forms of false consciousness or even bad
faith,249 here I will focus on how FEMA’s resistance to attending
to the problems of intersectionality, gathering narratives,
critiquing its own assumptions, and changing its own culture, are
247.
S-21.18: Civil Rights and FEMA Disaster Assistance, FEMA,
https://training.fema.gov/IS/courseOverview.aspx?code=IS-21.18 [https://perma.cc/HVF39K6R].
248. See FEMA Emergency Management Institute, List of Independent Study Courses,
FEMA, https://training.fema.gov/is/crslist.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z5BR-AR9K].
249. See, e.g., Rachel Cleetus, Ignoring the Role Climate Change Plays in US
Disasters
Helps
No
One,
COMMON
DREAMS
(MAR.
16,
2018),
https://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2018/03/16/ignoring-role-climate-changeplays-us-disasters-helps-no-one [https://perma.cc/AR7R-SZ8C] (“The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)—the government’s disaster first responder—has scrubbed
references to “climate change” from its four-year strategic plan released late yesterday.”);
Michael Taylor, Climate Change in the Caribbean – learning lessons from Irma and Maria,
THE
GUARDIAN
(OCT.
6,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/oct/06/climate-change-in-the-caribbeanlearning-lessons-from-irma-and-maria [https://perma.cc/3YZ8-Q3BU] (“Scientific analysis
shows that the climate of the Caribbean region is already changing in ways that seem to
signal the emergence of a new climate regime. Irma and Maria fit this pattern all too well.”).
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reflected in a memo issue in July of 2018 by Administrator Long.
They are also revealed in FEMA training documents that are still
in use.

A. LONG’S JULY REPORT
Since Maria, FEMA Administrator Brock Long and his
agency have not embraced race and class consciousness in a way
called for by this paper. In a report issued on July 12, 2018,
Administrator Long admitted that that “[t]he response to the
hurricanes demonstrated the need for emergency managers at all
levels to improve collaboration with the critical infrastructure
sectors.”250 FEMA also acknowledged that it had not made a
Puerto Rico disaster plan that figured in the problems with the
electrical grid or the territory’s poverty; 251 and it observed that it
“could have better leveraged open-source information and
preparedness data, such as capability assessments and exercise
findings, for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.” 252 It
further recognized that it needed to “revise the National Response
Framework . . . to emphasize stabilization of critical lifelines and
coordination across critical infrastructure sectors,”253 as well as to
work with “whole community partners” in the future.254
Yet Long emphasized additionally that “[t]hose closest to the
impacted areas are the true first responders during any emergency
or disaster”255 and suggested that the way forward required that
FEMA “simplif[y] its process.”256 More troublingly, FEMA
indicated that its logistics problems in Puerto Rico reflected
poorly on local Puerto Rican government, who should have taken
up the reins: “FEMA provided logistical coordination to move
250. See FEMA, 2017 HURRICANE SEASON FEMA AFTER-ACTION REPORT iii (July
12,
2018),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1531743865541d16794d43d3082544435e1471da07880/2017FEMAHurricaneAAR.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/65W5-CVNB] [hereinafter, AFTER-ACTION REPORT].
251. Id. at 10 (“plans did not address insufficiently maintained infrastructure (e.g., the
electrical grid) . . . . In addition, they did not address financial liquidity challenges facing the
Territorial government”).
252. Id. at vi.
253. Id. at vii.
254. Id.
255. See AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 250, at ii.
256. Id. at iii.
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and distribute commodities from staging areas to survivors in
Puerto Rico, supplementing a role that should largely be managed
and coordinated at the state or territory level.” 257 The report also
indicated that the public should not depend so much on the agency
in times of disaster: “The work of emergency management does
not belong just to FEMA. It is the responsibility of the whole
community, federal, [state, local, tribal and territorial
governments], private sector partners, and private citizens to build
collective capacity and prepare for the disasters we will inevitably
face.”258 This statement was interpreted by some observers as
“urg[ing] communities in harm’s way not to count so heavily on
FEMA in a future crisis.”259
While the report’s authors did recommend that FEMA
“[b]roaden” its “capability to quickly get teams on the ground to
stage and deliver key commodities to disaster survivors, even in
the most remote locations,” 260 and promises that it is “working
with whole community partners to improve risk management and
strengthen capabilities,” it says it will do this by adopting “a new
assessment methodology that requires all states, territories, tribes,
and major urban areas to use standard, outcome based language
to set objectives and assess their current capabilities against those
objectives.”261
FEMA’s emphasis on territory responsibility and its
secondary status as an aid provider fail the standard that I am
calling for here, in that FEMA is not embracing its constitutional
status as an affirmatively equal deliverer of disaster aid.262 In
addition, its future emphasis on simplification and
standardization cuts in the opposite direction to which the agency
257. Id. at viii.
258. Id. at 50.
259. Frances Robles, FEMA Was Sorely Unprepared for Puerto Rico Hurricane,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (JULY 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/us/femapuerto-rico-maria.html [https://perma.cc/A73L-EUKW]; Emily Atkin, The Troubling
Failure of America’s Disaster Response, NEW REPUBLIC (JULY 17, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/149899/troubling-failure-americas-disaster-response
[https://perma.cc/B3HE-267F] (“Trump’s FEMA wasn’t ready for last year’s recordbreaking hurricane season, and it wants the public to know that it’s not ready for another
one.”).
260. See AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 250, at viii.
261. Id. at 13.
262. See supra discussion accompanying notes 200-04.
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should now pivot – that is, towards comprehending the
complexity of victim identity. 263 Also, FEMA’s report contains
no recognition of the race and class traumas of the FEMA
response in Puerto Rico: A review of the report reveals that there
is no mention of “race,” “class,” “sexuality” “colonialism,”
“elderly,” or “gender.” There are two mentions of the word
“disability,” but they refer only to one mention of the Disability
Coordinator’s acronym 264 and a footnote reference to “disability
integration.”265
Further, the report’s emphasis on territories’ responsibilities
to be their own saviors 266 fails to recognize the poverty and
deprivation that colonialism wreaks upon territories and that can
prohibit their acting as effective responders in the wake of
disaster. It seems to blame the victim, as it were. The report also
does not recognize that the bleak difference between the response
in Puerto Rico and those in Houston and Florida 267 is felt by many
Puerto Ricans and other Americans to constitute a deprivation of
equal protection of the laws:268 There is simply no recognition of
the deep trauma caused by this discrimination. And, finally, there
is no protocol mentioned for the acquisition of key narratives that
would educate FEMA about vulnerable populations.

B. THE EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS ALSO DO NOT
REFLECT A CULTURE OF CRITICAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
FEMA provides training for emergency responders through
its Emergency Management Institute (EMI). 269 The EMI
supports FEMA by “improving the competencies of the U.S.
officials in Emergency Management at all levels of government
to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and
263. See Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 26-27 (rounding up complaints against
FEMA agents).
264. See AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 250, at 51.
265. Id. at 15 n.g.
266. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
267. See Levenson, supra note 133.
268. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
269.
Emergency
Management
Institute
Mission,
FEMA,
https://training.fema.gov/mission.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q4E4-Y4GP].
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mitigate the potential effects of all types of disasters and
emergencies on the American people.” 270 It trains “Federal, State,
local, tribal, volunteer, public, and private sector officials” who
respond to disasters. 271 In so doing, it supports the execution of
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National
Response Framework (NRF), the National Disaster Recovery
Framework (NDRF), and the National Preparedness Goal
(NPG).272
In this section, I will only analyze FEMA’s “Civil Rights and
FEMA Disaster Assistance” and “Diversity Awareness” courses,
as they seem the two most inclined to create space to train for the
issues I write about in this paper. Neither course inculcates the
epistemic values 273 of critical race and class consciousness in the
ways described by Karen Tani, for example, when she described
how Social Security Administration’s A. Delafield Smith,
“preached” that poor relief was a “matter of right,” and taught this
philosophy in training guides for local welfare workers.274 That
is, these courses insufficiently train agents in the type of critical
administrative constitutionalism called for by this paper.

1. FEMA’s Civil Rights Course
FEMA’s Civil Rights course reveals that the Agency
conceives of diversity fairness in terms of inter-state members’
civil rights to equal accommodation275 without specifying that
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Miranda Fricker argues that testimonial injustice may be countered by practicing
“actively . . . bring[ing] critical thought to bear on [one’s] . . . internalized habits of hearer
response in order to shake them up sufficiently to effect any adjustment.” See FRICKER,
supra note 169, at 84. Such “shaking up” could be experienced in training through exposing
students to tales of race, class, disability, gender, sexuality, and other injustice and
introducing the practice of self-critique.
274. See Welfare and Rights, supra note 63, at 319 (“Drafted primarily by professional
social workers with the clearance of lawyers, these guides enumerated rights apart from a
basic guarantee of income support that, with the creation of federal-state welfare
programming, were now established in law. These included the right to submit a formal
application for assistance, the right to receive fair treatment, the right to spend support
payments freely, and the right to keep private one’s reliance on the state.”).
275. See IS-0021.18 Civil Rights and FEMA Disaster Assistance 2018, FEMA,
https://emilms.fema.gov/IS0021.18/curriculum/1.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8KG-HC5D]
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wealthier states and poorer ones, and states and territories,
together enjoy equal forms of protection provided by the Stafford
Act. In addition, it does not impress upon its agents the ethic that
aid is a “matter of right,” as A. Delafield Smith once taught
welfare workers that poverty aid was a human rights concern. 276
Further, the course does not teach its agents about
intersectionality or the importance of narratives, and focuses
more on treating victims of disasters with “respect”277 than on
training agents on how to best distribute aid equally.
First, there is no FEMA course on the meaning of equal
protection and disaster aid, and no teachings about how equality
requires that different communities be given equal aid despite
their differences. 278 For FEMA, fairness means allowing
everyone equal entry to the accommodations provided by the
Agency279 – that is, that female, minority, disabled, or other
victims of aid be able to enter disaster recovery centers like
anyone else, and, once there, be treated with an “empathetic and
fair manner.”280 FEMA training also teaches that minority
victims should not be “[d]enied a service or benefit, [d]enied
access to or participation in a service or program although found
eligible, [p]rovided a different service, or [have] the service . . .
provided in a different manner.” 281 “Denial” here does not seem
to mean a meaningful denial – such as that occurs when a FEMA
(Civil Rights Act, As Amended, panel 8 of 85 states “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, prohibits discrimination in programs and activities receiving Federal financial
assistance based on: Race. Color. National origin.”).
276. See Welfare and Rights, supra note 63, at 319.
277. See supra note 275 (Civil Rights: A Guiding Principle, panel 5 of 85. See also
Protecting Civil Rights Through You Interactions, panel 37 of 85 states “By treating each
person fairly and with respect, you demonstrate FEMA’s commitment to providing
programs, services, and benefits to every eligible person fairly and without discrimination.”).
278. See supra note 248.
279. The problems with “sameness” have long been noted, for example, by feminist
theorists. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, (Un)equal Protection: Why Gender
Equality Depends on Discrimination, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2015) (“Even though women
have enjoyed formal equality under the law for decades—a central goal
of sameness feminism—the glass ceiling remains stubbornly difficult to break.”).
280. See supra note 275 (Civil Rights: A Guiding Principle, panel 5 of 85. See also
Protecting Civil Rights Through You Interactions, panel 37 of 85 states “By treating each
person fairly and with respect, you demonstrate FEMA’s commitment to providing
programs, services, and benefits to every eligible person fairly and without discrimination.”).
281. Id. (Discrimination, panel 20 of 85).
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agent cannot conceive that certain foods will be poisonous to
diabetic victims 282 or that people live in remote mountain
communities.283 Rather, a plain reading of “denial” would find
the term to mean an outright, even intentional, refusal to give a
service that is demanded by an “eligible” 284 person of color or
other minority. Further, there are lesson that FEMA contractors
not racially or sexually harass victims,285 that minority
communities not be deprived of disaster recovery centers, 286 that
agents “take the initiative” to cross language hurdles 287 (a lesson
that failed in Puerto Rico in the Maria aftermath), 288 and that
written information be made available in non-English
languages 289 and made accessible with those with visual
impairments 290 – but not that agents do the deep and often
difficult work to fathom the real needs of diverse communities in
order to offer them equivalent aid – that is, to engage in narrative
gathering and difficult, intersectionality-minded, self-critique.
While there is one mention in the lesson that an agent “put
[themselves] in the survivor’s place and to really look and see
how would [they] like to be treated,”291 plus a reminder that there

282. See Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 38 (quoting Roxanna Garcia as saying
“People shouldn’t be eating that food — especially with diabetes.”).
283. Id. at 42 (quoting Norbert Figueroa as saying “They were too slow, as in, there
were places up in the mountains where weeks – weeks, weeks! — from the hurricane [people
living there] still had not seen anyone—not a single government official had gone there to
their community or to check on the conditions or anything.”).
284. See supra note 275 (Civil Rights: A Guiding Principle, panel 5 of 85. See also
Protecting Civil Rights Through You Interactions, panel 37 of 85).
285. Id. (Examples of Discrimination, panel 23 of 85 states “A FEMA contractor
makes racially insensitive remarks or attempts to sexually harass an applicant seeking
assistance.”).
286. Id. (“Members of a minority community must travel many miles to reach a food
and water distribution site.”).
287. See id. (Working with LEP Populations, panel 53 of 85 states “It is important to
take the initiative to find out what language barriers exist in the local area and be ready to
address them.”).
288. See Epistemic Injustice, supra note 21, at 27 (quoting Maria Jiménez Colón as
saying “We haven’t encountered many FEMA inspectors who speak Spanish.”).
289. See supra note 275 (Accessible Information for LEP Individuals (2 of 2), panel
55 of 85).
290. See id. (Accessible Information for People with Visual Impairments, panel 58 of
85).
291. See id. (Civil Rights: A Guiding Principle, panel 5 of 85 provides a statement by
Martelle Chapital-Smith, Equal Rights Officer).
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is no “one size fits all”292 approach to aid distribution, there is no
real suggestion that agents investigate and imagine the lives of
vulnerable victims so as to understand how best to help them. The
few lessons in self-review ask agents only to, in the event of a
complaint, “consider whether something in your behavior might
have led to the perception of unfair treatment and, if so, how you
can improve that perception in the future.” 293 Throughout, the
emphasis in the lesson is that everyone get treated the same. 294
There is, however, one promising panel in the Civil Rights
course, titled Self Assessment. 295 This panel prompts students to
ask themselves whether they assess their own attitudes and biases,
try to understand the situation of the people they interact with,
seek to learn local demographics in the field, and work to be
“proactive” in their efforts to be inclusive. 296
This is the closest the FEMA Civil Rights training course
comes to inculcating critical administrative constitutionalism, and
could be the foundation upon which real teachings on
intersectionality, self-critique, and narrative gathering may be
built.

2. FEMA’s Diversity Awareness Course
The Diversity Course is no primer on critical race theory,
but, like the “Self Assessment” page of the Civil Rights course, it
does contain spaces upon which training in critical administrative
constitutionalism could be based. For example, the course
teaches agents that diversity “influence[s] how we perceive others

292. See id. (Nondiscrimination Concepts, panel 26 of 85 states “People with
disabilities do not all require the same assistance and do not all have the same needs.
Different types of disabilities affect people in different ways. Preparations should be made
for individuals with a variety of functional needs, including individuals who use mobility
aids, require medication or portable medical equipment, use service animals, need
information in alternate formats, or rely on a caregiver.”).
293. See id. (What If Your Own Actions Are in Question?, panel 79 of 85).
294. See supra note 275 (E is for Expectations, panel 40 of 85 states “To ensure that
members of the public are treated impartially, it is important to approach each situation with
the same expectations for everyone.”).
295. See id. (Self Assessment, panel 81 of 85).
296. Id.
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and their behaviors, as well as how others perceive us,” 297 and
instructs that appreciating diversity “[h]elps us to plan for and
respond to the needs of a diverse survivor population.” 298
Furthermore, it quotes a disaster survivor who says “if you don’t
understand or take the time out to try to understand [diverse
populations’] culture and what makes them tick, your services
may, although be needed, may not be wanted,” 299 and also teaches
that “[p]eople who are culturally or geographically isolated may
have greater risk and be disproportionately vulnerable to
disaster.”300 And it offers the observation that “[v]aluing
diversity helps us foster community-based resiliency by . . .
[l]earning from local leaders, and community members of
different cultural groups about their values, family norms,
traditions, community politics, etc., ideally before a disaster
strikes.”301
However, these are all vague suggestions for how
recognizing diversity can be “helpful,” instead of inculcating a
value system like A. Delafield Smith’s.302 The message also gets
muddled because it is mixed in with hortatory celebrations of
FEMA employee diversity and tolerance at that workplace – a
good principle, certainly, but one which should be dealt with
separately, so that the critical lessons on victim vulnerability and
diversity can be focused on in its own pedagogy. 303 And, when it
does make a concrete suggestion that agents should be
“curious . . . [because] curiosity expands your current
assumptions, breaks down cultural barriers, and builds awareness,
appreciation, and understanding of differences among people,” no
real lessons in how this works in a disaster context are given. 304
The course also sets an extremely low bar – instead of training
agents in how to better comprehend the critical realities of
297. See FEMA IS-0020.18: Diversity Awareness Course 2018, FEMA,
https://emilms.fema.gov/IS0020.18/curriculum/1.html
[https://perma.cc/887U-77XX]
(Diversity Definition, panel 7 of 73).
298. See id. (Diversity Benefits, panel 17 of 73).
299. See id. (Understanding the Communities We Serve, panel 19 of 73).
300. See id. (Disaster Impact and Cultural Diversity, panel 20 of 73).
301. See id. (Promoting Community-Based Resiliency Through Diversity, panel 21 of
73).
302. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 297 (Awareness and Acceptance of Difference, panel 35 of 73).
304. See id. (Overcoming Boundaries, 40 of 73).
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vulnerable populations in disaster contexts, it schools them in
“disability etiquette” (“no need to shout or speak loudly”) 305 and
not to call people names that qualify as anti-disability hate
speech,306 and not to call queer people names that are also hate
speech and that I will not repeat in this article, but which are
recited in the course. 307 I am not suggesting that anti-hate lessons
should not given here, but more is required.
In sum, FEMA training made available online does not
demonstrate that FEMA responders are now being trained
adequately in self-critique, intersectional consciousness, narrative
gathering, and, thus, creative critical administrative
constitutionalism. But it does contain a few tools with which we
can create a critical, liberationist, disaster relief culture.

VII. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
In order for FEMA to correct course, and embrace a critical
administrative constitutionalism that recognizes the Agency’s
duty to provide equal disaster aid to vulnerable communities
through an active engagement with intersectionality, self-critique,
and narrative gathering, it needs to make several changes now:
First, FEMA should stop blaming Puerto Rico for its own
suffering, and recognize instead its own equally protective duty
to meaningfully distribute aid to vulnerable populations during
disaster.308
Second, and relatedly, it should recognize itself as a first
priority responder in cases of subordinated communities, so as to
embrace its status as an equal distributor of meaningful aid.309
Third, it needs to recognize intersectionality in its
preparation for the future and its creation of methodology for
crisis responses. 310

305. See id. (Disability Etiquette, 53 of 73).
306. See id. (Language to Avoid, 54 of 73).
307. See id. (Offensive vs. Non-Offensive Language Related to LGBTQIA, panel 65 of
73).
308. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 255 (quoting FEMA report declining this status).
310. See text accompanying supra notes 66-67.
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Fourth, it needs to create protocols for gathering narratives
of vulnerable populations subject to disasters before and after the
catastrophe.311
Fifth, it needs to draw its responders and resources from
vulnerable, affected, communities, so that such narratives and
insight may be deployed. 312
Sixth, it must inculcate a culture of active self-assessment
that is in keeping with the culture cultivated by critical race
theory.313
Seventh, it must build upon the above-mentioned spaces
within its extant training that makes room for these dynamics. 314
In so doing, FEMA may model its new training protocols based
on the many works of diversity training that incorporate the
lessons of intersectionality and narrative: Examples of this may
be found in the work of Frank Rudy Cooper, 315 Peggy Li,316
Claudia Meyer and her team,317 Emma Kowal, Halyey Franklin,

311. See supra note 240 (finding spaces within the Stafford Act to implement narrative
gathering).
312. See text accompanying supra note 236 (discussing the engagement with people
on the ground as experts and consultants).
313. See supra note 230 (discussing the need to interrogate one’s own assumptions).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 240-45 (making recommendations on how to
do so).
315. Frank Rudy Cooper, ”Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and
Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 732 (2009) (engaging intersectionality to
critique and make suggestions about police training) (“If masculinist training is the problem,
anti-masculinist training may provide an essential answer—adjusting the behavior of cadets
and police officers.”).
316. Peggy Li, Hitting the Ceiling: An Examination of Barriers to Success for Asian
American Women, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 140, 166 (2014) (“An understanding
of implicit bias and intersectionality can assist businesses in recruiting a representative class
of Asian American women and avoiding future liability.”).
317. Claudia Meyer et al., Diversity Training For Community Aged Care Workers: An
Interdisciplinary Meta-Narrative Review, 43 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 365, 374 (2017)
(“Access and equity policy should reflect the broad nature of diversity rather than just a few
characteristics.”).
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and Yin Paradies, 318 Ellen K. Pao,319 Kate Hanigan,320 and Nicole
Robinson,321 not to mention the writings of Kimberlé
Crenshaw,322 Darren Hutchinson,323 Frank Valdes, 324 Angela
Harris,325 Berta Esperanza Hernández Truyol, 326 scholars who
318. Emma Kowal, Hayley Franklin & Yin Paradies, Reflexive Antiracism: A Novel
Approach To Diversity Training, 13 ETHNICITIES 316, 317 (2013) (“This article explores the
two major critiques of diversity training – essentialism and the elicitation of negative
emotions – and proposes the alternative approach of reflexive antiracism. This approach
addresses critiques of diversity training by drawing on insights from critical race theory,
social psychology, whiteness studies and literature on intersectionality, and through
incorporating the concepts of constructivism, racialisation and identity formation. We
provide examples of this approach from a diversity training course that two of the authors
present.”).
319. Pao seeks to form solutions to the dearth of women of color in tech through
creative intersectional strategies. See Ellen K. Pao, True Diversity is Intersectional, MEDIUM
(MAY 26, 2016), https://medium.com/projectinclude/true-diversity-is-intersectional2282b8da8882 [https://perma.cc/9GZS-SQ9W].
320. Kate Hanigan, Implications of Gender and Racial Intersectionality in the K-8
Classroom 7 (2017) (graduate theses and dissertation, University of Portland)
https://pilotscholars.up.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=etd
[https://perma.cc/6CW2-E7V7] (“intersectional awareness is associated with positive
perceptions of diverse groups and social justice activism, which might be considered
essential dispositions of culturally responsive teachers.”).
321. Nicole R. Robinson, Developing a Critical Consciousness for Diversity and
Equity Among Preservice Music Teachers, 26 J. OF MUSIC TEACHER EDUC. 16 (2017)
(describing a “professional development session . . . designed to increase a degree of critical
consciousness for diversity and equity among preservice music teachers. It was organized
into three sessions: understanding ‘Access,’ understanding ‘Intersectionality,’ and
understanding ‘Myths, Misconceptions, and Misdirections’ of music in urban schools.”).
322. See Crenshaw, supra note 6.
323.
Darren
Lenard
Hutchinson, Identity
Crisis:
“Intersectionality,”
“Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 291 (2001); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization
of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
1, 9-10 (1999); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 566 (1997).
324. Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory:
Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship; or,
Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 1451 (1998)
(intersectionality, and its related concept of multidimensionality (which more specifically
encompasses masculinities and queerness), “balanc[e] human complexity and social
heterogeneity in a scholarship of antisubordination solidarity.”).
325. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 615 (1990) (describing multiple consciousness).
326. Berta Esperanza Hernández Truyol, Building Bridges—Latinas and Latinos at
the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369,
433 (1994) (“embrac[ing] the acceptance that we are black latinas/os, white latinas/os,
mestizas/os, indias/os, and chinas/os; muslim, christian, santeras/os and jews; male and
female; lesbian/gay and heterosexual; rich and poor; physically able and physically
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participate in LatCrit engagements, 327 and many other writers of
intersectional literature.

VIII. AND NOW FOR THE LIFTED BROW
Reader, do not fear: I understand that my calls to make the
Stafford Act “proper” by infusing critical administrative
constitutionalism throughout the hierarchies of FEMA seems
insanely aspirational during an era when Brock Long appears
deeply beholden328 to a President who offers emotional supports
to white supremacists,329 mocks handicapped people, 330 tweeted
about Puerto Rican ingratitude when people were dying, 331 and
then denied the death toll estimate of approximately 3,000 people
in September of 2018.332
challenged; and so onFalseLatinas/os, because of our many components, have lived
multidimensionallyFalse”); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered:
Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 883-85 (1997);
Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Latina Multidimensionality and LatCrit Possibilities:
Culture, Gender, and Sex, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 812-15 (1999).
327. Francisco Valdes, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence
and Latina/o Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 55 (1997) (noting that “[t]he
symposium authors generally agree that these interrogations require LatCrit theorists to
employ cross-disciplinary analysis as well as critical concepts like multiplicity, multidimensionality and intersectionality, which come from outsider legal scholars.”).
328. Chuck Ross, FEMA Chief Defends Trump Tweets, Dings San Juan Mayor
[Video], DAILY CALLER (SEPT. 13, 2017), http://dailycaller.com/2017/09/30/fema-chiefdefends-trump-tweets-dings-san-juan-mayor-video/
[https://perma.cc/9C6L-5ZGC]
(“FEMA administrator Brock Long defended a series of tweets from President Trump
blasting San Juan’s mayor for criticizing the relief efforts following Hurricane Maria. In an
interview on CNN, Long suggested that Carmen Yulin Cruz, the mayor of Puerto Rico’s
capital city, has failed to connect with a command center FEMA set up on the island to help
with the relief effort.”).
329. See Michael D. Shear and Maggie Haberman, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on
Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides,’ N.Y. TIMES (AUG. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conferencecharlottesville.html [https://perma.cc/2NCJ-XLW6].
330. John Berman, Trump mocks reporter with disability, CNN (JUNE 25, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/11/26/donald-trump-mocks-reporter-with-disabilityberman-sot-ac.cnn [https://perma.cc/QZ5A-YFMB].
331. See supra note 135.
332. Alexander Mallin & Nataly Pak, Trump Casts Doubt on Puerto Rico Hurricane
Death Toll: ‘3000 People Did Not Die,’ ABC NEWS (SEPT. 13, 2018),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-3000-people-die-puerto-rico-hurricanesblames/story?id=57796141 [https://perma.cc/NRC5-MJXW] (“3000 people did not die in
the two hurricanes that hit Puerto Rico,” Trump said in a tweet. “When I left the Island,
AFTER the storm had hit, they had anywhere from 6 to 18 deaths. As time went by it did not
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But that does not mean that we should not ask FEMA to rise
to the challenge that it failed to meet during and after Hurricane
Maria. Maybe these efforts will come from the top. It is also
conceivable that Puerto Rican representatives may effectively
lobby agency nabobs to help change FEMA’s culture and
commitments.333 But, in seeking a method that is more in line
with the bottom-up strategy of critical race feminism, 334 we might
do well to channel the work of Jennifer Nou, 335 Rosemary
O’Leary,336 Eric Posner,337 Daniel Hemel, 338 John Michaels,339

go up by much. Then, a long time later, they started to report really large numbers, like
3000’.”) (quoting Trump’s Twitter account).
333. I thank Miriam Seifter for this suggestion. Her work in this field is exemplary.
See Miriam Seifter, States As Interest Groups In The Administrative Process, 100 VA. L.
REV. 953, 955-56 (2014) (“[S]tate involvement in federal regulation has been
operationalized through a largely overlooked universe of ‘state interest groups’—myriad
associations of state officials that lobby federal agencies and consult on pending federal rules
and policies, advancing the ‘state’ view.”). See also Maggie McKinley, Petitioning And The
Making Of The Modern Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538, 1539 (2018)
(documenting the general phenomenon of petitioning).
334. See, e.g,. Debora L. Threedy, Legal Archeology And Feminist Legal Theory: A
Case Study Of Gender And Domestic Violence, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 171, 172-73 n.11
(2008) (“Bottom-up theorizing is also a feature of feminist legal theory, critical race theory,
queer theory, and other outsider jurisprudence.”).
335. See Nou, supra note 70 (“It is thus the right time to ask what levers of resistance
are available to civil servants. These levers may be especially attractive to those faced with
one of several prospects: top-down orders to carry out illegal tasks, suppress information, or
doctor technical documents.”).
336. See O’LEARY, supra note 71, at xi (“This book is about guerilla government.
Guerilla government is my term for the actions taken by career public servants who work
against the wishes – either implicitly or explicitly communicated – of their superiors.”).
337. See Posner, supra note 72 (“The greatest constraint on Mr. Trump may be the
federal bureaucracy. If he directs the F.B.I., I.R.S. or Department of Homeland Security to
harass his political opponents, civil servants will probably not cooperate — indeed, they may
blow the whistle.”).
338. See Hemel, supra note 73 (“What checks and balances might prevent President
Trump from taking [illegal or at least abysmal] executive actions . . . ? . . . [T]he Department
of Homeland Security. By this, I don’t mean the Secretary of Homeland Security — Trump
would want to pick a loyalist for that post. I mean the Department of Homeland Security
rank-and-file — the hundreds of thousands of DHS employees whose active participation
would be necessary to implement Trump’s policy (even if they have no formal say in the
matter under the Constitution).”).
339. See Michaels, supra note 74 (“Consider the civil service. Our professional,
politically insulated civil service is ostensibly well positioned to limit presidential
overreaching.”).
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Marie-Amélie George, 340 and Arden Rowell341 and clamor for
this awakening as a form of “bureaucratic resistance from
below.”342 Individual FEMA workers could resolve to teach
themselves and each other how to engage their jobs in the spirit
of critical administrative constitutionalism by learning about
intersectionality, engaging in self-critique and consciousness
raising, and gathering narratives of subordinated and at-risk
populations before, during, and after a disaster.
Their
engagement would lead to lessons on how best to serve vulnerable
populations, take a creative, ambitious stance toward their job,
and in so doing fulfill the spirit of equal protection embodied in
“letter and spirit” of the Constitution.
It remains the case, however, that many impediments to this
level of bureaucratic change exist, such as the ways that
administration heads fashion vertical culture and power structures
through
subdelegations 343
censorious
self-regulation,344

340. Marie-Amélie George, Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the Transformation
of LGBT Rights, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y Rev. 83, 98 (2017) (“At first
blush, bureaucratic resistance appears to introduce inconsistency into law, but it in fact may
make the legal system more internally coherent.”).
341. Arden Rowell, Environmental Lawmaking Within Federal Agencies and Without
Judicial Review, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 567, 573 (2017) (“Bureaucratic resistance has
a long tradition in the administrative state. Resistance—or what Rosemary O’Leary
picturesquely calls ‘guerrilla government’ —arises when career public servants work against
the wishes of their superiors.”).
342. See Nou, supra note 70 (“It is thus the right time to ask what levers of resistance
are available to civil servants. These levers may be especially attractive to those faced with
one of several prospects: top-down orders to carry out illegal tasks, suppress information, or
doctor technical documents.”); see O’LEARY, supra note 71, at xi (“This book is about
guerilla government. Guerilla government is my term for the actions taken by career public
servants who work against the wishes – either implicitly or explicitly communicated – of
their superiors.”).
343. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 509
(2017) (“. . . new political appointees can revoke delegations to subordinates no longer
expected to share their preferences.”).
344. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 860
(2009) (describing “a ubiquitous phenomenon: administrative agencies routinely ‘selfregulate.’ That is, they limit their options when no source of authority requires them to do
so. They voluntarily constrain their discretion. ”).
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punishment,345 and the inculcation of “role perception” 346 that
shrinks at leveraging a rebellious critical race bureaucratic
practice so inconsistent with contemporary Presidential and
FEMA mores. The response to such challenges will have to come
from the current generation of civil servants who have discovered
that being loyal to their agency and to their country can require
their resistance, dissent, and the courage to embark upon a new
way of thinking and working. 347
To that end, even small organizing and consciousnessraising efforts at the bureaucratic level could have far reaching
influence, if engaged energetically and deeply. Something as
seemingly modest as a weekly discussion or book group held by
two or three agents could achieve an ever-widening circle of
persuasion. If we look to other historical examples for
inspiration, we see that in 1980’s eastern Germany, “tiny circles”
of peace activists committed to denuclearization “quickly came
to channel a wider discontent with the ideological constrains
imposed by the regime. Prayers for peace were necessarily
prayers for an end to Cold War divisions . . . [and] [b]y 1987 a socalled ‘Church from Below’ challenged the official consistory
structure of the Protestant Church.”348
Furthermore, one of the initiations of the woman of color
political movement began with a few women meeting together in
the Dorchester, Massachusetts living room of a political activist
345. Cf., Adam Goldman & Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Agent Peter Strzok, Who
Criticized Trump in Texts, Is Fired, N.Y. TIMES (AUG. 13, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/us/politics/peter-strzok-fired-fbi.html
[https://perma.cc/7GQW-FWXA].
346. MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS
AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 22 (2000) (“The concept of role
perception is thus meant to capture a civil service ethic, code of conduct, and sense of duty
that lead career civil servants to be responsive to their Presidential principals.”).
347. See Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Exit and Loyalty under Trump, TAKE C ARE (JAN.
9,
2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/bureaucratic-exit-and-loyalty-under-trump
[https://perma.cc/S4HY-D7HY] (“Loyal civil servants are exercising voice
through petitions, rogue Twitter accounts, and public demonstrations.”); Hundreds Of
Current And Former Epa Employees Protest Trump’s Nominee In Chicago, CHIC. TRIB.
(FEB. 6, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-trump-epa-protestchicago-20170206-story.html [https://perma.cc/9MYH-JB63].
348. Charles S. Maier, Civil Resistance and Civil Society:Lessons from the Collapse
of the German Democratic Republic in 1989, in CIVIL RESISTANCE AND P OWER POLITICS:
THE EXPERIENCE OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION FROM GANDHI TO THE PRESENT 267 (2009).
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named Demita Frazier: In 1974, Frazier, Beverly Smith, and
Barbara Smith met to talk about “radical economics” 349 and
creating a Boston chapter of the National Black Feminist
Organization.350 They wound up creating the Combahee River
Collective, which put out its famous Statement articulating the
importance of recognizing the complexities of Black female
identity.351 As Frazier later recounted in an interview: “It was a
moment of power because I think we all recognized very quickly
in that meeting in my living room that we were at the precipice of
something really important. That was literally how it started,
sitting in someone’s living room. . . .”352
Thus, the history of grass roots social change movements can
create a path for the future of FEMA’s embrace of critical
administrative constitutionalism and bureaucratic resistance from
below.

IX. CONCLUSION
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution requires that Congress
enacts laws that are necessary and proper for the exercise of its
permissible powers. 353 200 years ago, the Supreme Court in
McCulloch v. Maryland established the test for when necessity
and propriety could be found to exist, 354 including the
requirement that Congressional laws be “consist[ent] with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution.”355 The Stafford Act, enacted
by Congress in 1974, 356 appears initially a necessary and proper
expression of its powers to regulate the general welfare under

349. DUCHESS HARRIS, BLACK FEMINIST POLITICS FROM KENNEDY TO C LINTON 9
(2009).
350. Id. at 11.
351. Id. at 7 (“Its widely circulated ‘Combahee River Collective Statement’ helped to
lay the foundation for feminist of color organizing in the 1980s and the 1990s.”).
352. Id. at 11.
353. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Article I.
354. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
355. Id.
356. Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207
(2000)).
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McCulloch.357 Furthermore, no one appears to be arguing that it
is not.358
But the Stafford Act is improper under a race and class
justice reading of the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution’s
promise of equal protection because it does not account
sufficiently for intersectionality. 359 There is an inadequate
attendance in the law to questions of race, class, gender, poverty,
disability, rural, and elder status. 360 Nevertheless, the Stafford
Act does contain some anti-discrimination provisions, and these
appear to have done nothing to prevent a significant chasm
between the aid rendered to Houston and Florida versus Puerto
Rico.361 In sum, the Stafford Act appears to fail the tests of
McCulloch, but we may suspect that the addition of yet more
language into the Act may not be sufficient currently to render the
law “proper.”
It seems that FEMA must take responsibility, then, if the
Stafford Act is to be executed in a way that properly coheres with
the letter and spirit of constitutional equal protection guarantees.
To do so, FEMA must embrace its independent role as a deliverer
of constitutional goods, that is, disaster aid allocated to vulnerable
people. The theory of administrative constitutionalism creates a
context for such an awakening to occur, but the lessons of critical
race theory, from where “intersectionality’s” insights were
developed, must be absorbed in this engagement. This
development would require both a transformation of FEMA
culture and also, perhaps, of the theory of administrative
constitutionalism itself. FEMA should consider its future in light
of a critical administrative constitutionalism, and give aid to
vulnerable populations within a culture and a practice that
recognizes intersectionality, self-critiques, and avidly gathers
narratives.

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
See supra notes 95-96.
See supra notes 170-90 and accompanying text.
Id.
See Levenson, supra note 133.

